

A Kind of Magic: The Origins and Culture of ‘Pseudolaw’

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On the 3rd of September 1783 a small group of men came together at Rue Jacob, Paris, in what was then the Hôtel d’York. It had been an unusual summer in Europe. A series of volcanic eruptions in Iceland, later known as the Laki eruption, had spewed untold quantities of sulphur into the atmosphere. The resulting sulphuric fog settled like a pall over the northern hemisphere, producing one of the most severe winters on record in Europe and North America. One of the men attending the Hôtel d’York that day was Benjamin Franklin. He later recalled

During several of the summer months of the year 1783, when the effect of the sun's rays to heat the earth in these northern regions should have been greater, there existed a constant fog over all Europe, and a great part of North America. This fog was of a permanent nature; it was dry, and the rays of the sun seemed to have little effect towards dissipating it, as they easily do a moist fog, arising from water. They were indeed rendered so faint in passing through it, that when collected in the focus of a burning glass they would scarce kindle brown paper. Of course, their summer effect in heating the Earth was exceedingly diminished. Hence the surface was early frozen. Hence the first snows remained on it unmelted, and received continual additions. Hence the air was more chilled, and the winds more severely cold. Hence perhaps the winter of 1783–4 was more severe than any that had happened for many years.¹

Widespread air pollution from the eruptions directly contributed to a mortality crisis in England and France. In 1783 in England 10,000 more people died than would have been expected in a normal year. It has been suggested the French experience was similar.² The following severe winters caused crops to fail across Europe, including in France. It is quite probable that the direct and indirect increase in mortality from the Laki eruptions contributed to the French Revolution six years later.

But in the Latin Quarter in early September 1783, it was a different revolution that was on the minds of the men who gathered at the Hôtel d’York. These were representatives of the Kingdom of Great Britain and the nascent republic of the United States of America. They came together to sign the treaty to end the American Revolution and recognise the sovereignty of the United States. The Revolutionary War had been long and brutal. Its last battle, the Siege of Yorktown, was fought in the fall of 1781 and saw the surrender of Lord Cornwallis and the capture of his army. At various times between 1776 and 1781 the United States came perilously close to bankruptcy.³ To fund the war, the Continental Congress secured loans from European powers whose interests were hostile to the British. Between them, France, Spain, and the Netherlands advanced loans that would today be valued at more than US\$10 million. Benjamin

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¹ Benjamin Franklin, ‘Meteorological imaginations and conjectures’ in *Memoirs of the Literary and Philosophical Society of Manchester*, (1785) 1st series, Vol 2, 357–361.

² John Grattan, Roland Rabartin, Stephen Self, Thorvaldur Thordason, ‘Volcanic air pollution and mortality in France 1783-1784’, (2005) 337(7) *Comptes Rendus – Geoscience* 641-651.

³ In early September 1781 an army of 4,000 French and 3,000 American soldiers marching to Yorktown refused to leave Maryland until paid in hard coin rather than worthless Continental paper money.

Franklin personally negotiated the loan of the modern-day equivalent of US\$2 million from France. The United States struggled to repay these debts after the war. At times it defaulted on payments, and it was not until the late 18th century when the loans were finally settled.

Franklin, of course, has come to be regarded as one of the great American heroes (despite being an unabashed British patriot for all but the last two decades of his life⁴). He helped draft the declaration of independence and from 1776 to 1785 was the United States' ambassador to France. Franklin is the only person to have signed the Declaration of Independence in 1776, Treaty of Alliance with France in 1778, Treaty of Paris in 1783, and United States Constitution in 1787. Among his many memorials is a reproduction of Franklin's likeness on the US\$100 bill. But before all this, when Franklin was in his 30s, he was appointed as the postmaster of Philadelphia. He reorganised the postal system in the north-east, turning a profit for the first time. When the American Revolution began in 1775, the Continental Congress named Franklin as the first United States Postmaster-General.

By now, you might be wondering what any of this has to do with the topic of this paper? What connection could there be between Benjamin Franklin, the American Revolution and what has come to be known as 'pseudolaw' or, more particularly, the branch of pseudolaw generally called the sovereign citizen (SovCit) movement? To find the answer to these questions we must jump forward in history to the end of the 20th century and Russell Jay Gould, or, as he would style himself, :Russell-Jay: Gould.

Gould believes, or at least he claims to believe, that in July 1776 the United States was bankrupt. It was bankrupt because of the loan Benjamin Franklin had secured from France a year earlier, just after he had been named Postmaster-General. In 1776, at the time of the declaration of independence, the debtors moved in and, according to Gould, a consortium of 'foreign elites' and bankers, led for some reason by King George III, took ownership of the United States and the office of Postmaster-General. This position obtained for centuries, with the real power in the United States resting with the 'true' Postmaster-General. It was a situation unnoticed by Presidents, politicians, and the people. Then, in the late 1990s when Gould was researching bankruptcy law and the legal system (for reasons he does not disclose and about which I will not speculate) he discovered this startling fact. Working with the now deceased David Wynn Miller (:David-Wynn: Miller), the pair unlocked the secrets of 'quantum grammar', a concept to which I will return. Armed with this novel linguistic tool, Gould was able to discover that the bankruptcy of the United States was finally to be enforced on 2 November 1999, coincidentally an 'off-year' election day. If nothing were done, the United States would once more become a colonial possession of the British Crown. In an even more remarkable twist, the shadowy cabal behind this enterprise had allowed the position of Postmaster-General lapse. Gould seized his opportunity.

Ninety days before the election I filed in as Postmaster-General with the bills of lading here with the United States Postal Office but I hand wrote it under here and you can see my ink under here and they put a label on this mail-slip – and labels are classified as tickets, and tickets are classified as stamps, and when I put my autograph across it I became the Postmaster-General of the United States Postal Service.⁵

⁴ George Goodwin, *Benjamin Franklin in London: The British Life of America's Founding Father* (Yale University Press, 2016).

⁵ Ramola D, 'The Restoration of the United States of America–Commander-in-Chief, Postmaster-General-of-the-World :Russell-Jay: Gould has the Title 4 Flag', *The Everyday Concerned Citizen*, (Blog Post, 30 August 2020) <<https://everydayconcerned.net/2020/08/30/the-restoration-of-the-united-states-of-america-commander-in-chief-postmaster-general-of-the-world-russell-jay-gould-has-the-title-4-flag/>>.

Together with a filing in the United States Federal Courts pursuant to Title 4 of the United States Code,⁶ and a quick visit to the Pentagon to negotiate a peace treaty, Gould became the ‘sovereign king’ of the United States, with plenary powers to authorise or dismiss governments, banks, the military, and the courts.⁷ This also has the happy consequence, or so Gould claims, that the tax laws of the United States did not apply to him. Gould maintains a YouTube channel with a healthy audience.⁸ He also seems to attract like-minded people from around the world who seek him out for ‘authorisation’ of documents in his position as Postmaster-General.⁹

Despite the fervour with which Gould and others appear to hold to these views, they are yet to find favour in any legal system throughout the world. It is tempting to dismiss proponents of pseudolaw as mere crackpots and annoyances. But there is a darker side to pseudolaw, one found in its origins in the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The framework of pseudolaw can be traced to the same explicitly racist and anti-Semitic beliefs that underpin the white-supremacist movement.¹⁰ The imprint of these origins remains – some sub-movements express the anti-Semitic belief that ‘foreign elites’ and the ‘Rothschild banking faction’ control the world and are the enemies of sovereign citizens.¹¹ The pseudolaw movement is also growing in line with a broader anti-government sentiment. There would be few people who have not seen images of so-called ‘Freedom’ rallies in the last two years. It is common at these rallies to see prominent displays of the Australian Red Ensign, a flag adopted by the SovCit movement. In keeping with the origins of the movement, the flag of the Ustashe, a Croatian ultra-national fascist movement of the early 20th century who were aligned with the Nazis in World War 2, might also have been seen.¹²

For at least these reasons, it is timely to consider what pseudolaw is, and to at least begin a discussion about how courts might respond to the increase in litigants-in-person espousing these views that may be expected in coming years. In this paper I will set out a brief overview of the history of pseudolaw, a short essay of the beliefs and theories that underpin pseudolaw and consider how the courts might respond to such litigants.

The origins of the pseudolaw movement

A detailed survey of the history and emergence of the pseudolaw movement is beyond the scope of this paper. An overview is sufficient to identify some matters that remain of relevance notwithstanding the evolution of the movement since its origins.

⁶ The US Code is the compendium of standing Federal Statutes in the United State. Title 4 deals with the flag, including it description and permitted use, the Great Seal of the United States and designates Washington DC as the seat of the Federal Government.

⁷ Ramola D (n 5).

⁸ <<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC2FPVSe66WpLdfoiQem4FzA>>. Gould’s most popular video has been viewed nearly 334,000 times.

⁹ I encountered one such person in *R v Sweet* [2021] QDC 216.

¹⁰ Leonard Zeskind, *Blood and Politics: The History of the White Nationalist Movement from the Margins to the Mainstream* (Macmillan, 2009).

¹¹ ‘Judge’ Dale, *The Great American Adventure*, (self-published, 2014). Dale is a soi-disant retired United States federal judge who, among other things, expresses the view that, ‘The Illuminati are hell bent upon making Bible Prophecy come true and are responsible for much of the Biblical like devastation that has been occurring around the Earth.’

¹² Zac Crellin, ‘From anti-vaxxers to “Sovereign Citizens”’: A who’s who of the Convoy to Canberra protest, *The New Daily* (online at 7 February 2022)

<<https://thenewdaily.com.au/news/national/2022/02/07/canberra-protest-anti-vaxxers/>>;

Josh Roose, ‘How “freedom rally” protesters and populist right-wing politics may play a role in the federal election’, *The Conversation* (online at 15 February 2022) <<https://theconversation.com/how-freedom-rally-protesters-and-populist-right-wing-politics-may-play-a-role-in-the-federal-election-176533>>.

Three points in time are significant in the development of pseudolaw. The first is the period known as Reconstruction following the American Civil War, during which time the 14th amendment to the United States constitution was adopted. The second is a time in the 1960s and 1970s when the notion of Posse Comitatus¹³ was revived and explicitly realigned with the racist Christian Identity movement. The third is the period from the late 1990s to the present which has seen an explosion in the dissemination and evolution of pseudolaw ideas.

Reconstruction

On 26 April 1865, 12 days after John Wilkes Booth shot and killed President Abraham Lincoln, the 90,000 strong Army of Tennessee surrendered to Major General William Tecumseh Sherman in North Carolina. Within weeks, the rump of Confederate forces had surrendered or been captured. The Civil War was over, and Reconstruction could begin. The 14th amendment was passed by congress in the middle of 1866. Its first clause guaranteed citizenship to former slaves by promising

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.¹⁴

By late July 1868 sufficient states had ratified the amendment for it to pass into law. Ratification was a necessary pre-condition to admission to the Union. Some confederate states chafed but eventually relented. Still, there was a significant portion of the southern population who were not prepared to accept equal rights for African Americans. The legal notion of posse comitatus was used by the northern Radical Republicans to employ troops to enforce Reconstruction policies and police organisations such as the Ku Klux Klan.

Posse comitatus has a long history that can be traced to the reign of Alfred the Great in ninth-century England.¹⁵ It has been put to all sorts of uses in the United States. There have undoubtedly been times in the history of the United States when posses carried out lynching and other unlawful killings. Immediately before the Civil War the use of posse comitatus to enforce the *Fugitive Slave Act* of 1850¹⁶ in Northern States brought slavery home to the north and helped bring on the Civil War.¹⁷ The reliance on Federal troops in the south in the Reconstruction period was a source of tension. Resistance from the Southern Democrats was such that in 1877 President Rutherford Hayes withdrew Federal troops from the south. This was followed in 1878 by the *Posse Comitatus Act*, which prohibited the use of the army as a posse comitatus.¹⁸ The withdrawal of the military from the south and the effect of the *Posse*

¹³ Literally ‘power of the country’. Posse comitatus describes *ad hoc* militia groups deputised by a local authority, such as a Sherriff, to assist in law enforcement.

¹⁴ This provision has been at the heart of some of the most significant constitutional cases in Unites States history: *Brown v Board of Education of Topeka* 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (desegregating schools and overruling the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine of *Plessy v Ferguson* 163 U.S. 537 (1896)); *Roe v Wade*, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion rights); and *Obergefell v Hodges*, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (same sex marriage).

¹⁵ David Kopel, ‘The Posse Comitatus and the Office of Sherriff: Armed Citizens Summoned to the Aid of Law Enforcement’ (2015) 104(4) *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology – Symposium on Guns in America*.

<https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7539&context=jclc>.

¹⁶ An act that required all escaped slaves, upon capture, be returned to the slaver.

¹⁷ Kopel (n 15) 799-800.

¹⁸ Kopel (n 15) 801.

Comitatus Act significantly contributed to the failure of Reconstruction.¹⁹ This failure allowed racism to become embedded in the structure of Southern society, causing lower levels of Black wealth and education and the massive migration of Black people to the northern states in the decades that followed.²⁰ This structural racism and its effects continued into the Jim Crow era and the Civil Rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s (and, it may be argued, continues today). The passage of the *Civil Rights Act* in 1964 was significant, but alone it was insufficient to remediate the racism of some white Americans. In the 1970s some of these white Americans found a home in the Christian Identity movement and produced a new anti-government movement.

Christian identity

The Anti-Defamation League describes Christian Identity as follows.

Christian Identity is a religious ideology popular in extreme right-wing circles. Adherents believe that whites of European descent can be traced back to the ‘Lost Tribes of Israel’. Many consider Jews to be the Satanic offspring of Eve and the Serpent, while non-whites are ‘mud peoples’ created before Adam and Eve. Its virulent racist and anti-Semitic beliefs are usually accompanied by extreme anti-government sentiments. Despite its small size, Christian Identity influences virtually all white supremacist and extreme anti-government movements. It has also informed criminal behavior ranging from hate crimes to acts of terrorism.²¹

The movement evolved from a fringe belief that the inhabitants of the British Isles were the true descendants of the Jewish tribes exiled from the Kingdom of Israel in the eighth century. Once on American soil, this idea morphed into a virulent anti-Semitic ideology.²² William Potter Gale was a former army Lieutenant Colonel and some-time preacher who adhered to the tenets of Christian identity. Gale was also fiercely anti-government. In 1971 he established a group he called Posse Comitatus, reflecting Gale’s idea that god was the source of all law and consequently the Federal government had no authority over individuals. This ‘Christian law’ is the ‘common law’, immutable and unchanging, as distinct from statute or ‘judge-made’ law.²³ The adoption of the name Posse Comitatus came from Gale’s belief that local Sheriffs were obliged to defend the people from government tyranny. The undercurrent of Posse Comitatus was the familiar anti-Semitic theory of corrupt Jewish bankers being the secret controllers of the world.²⁴

Gale and others focussed on ‘delegitimizing the federal authority through arcane and dubious explanations of how citizens have been misled into subjecting themselves unnecessarily to federal authority’.²⁵ In the early 1970s, at a time of economic stress, the Posse Comitatus attracted, and borrowed ideas from, those who wished to avoid bankruptcy and foreclosure. It

¹⁹ Axel Melkonian, ‘The Posse Comitatus Act: its Reconstruction Era Roots and Link to Modern Racism’, *Sydney University Law Society* (Blog Post, 2 September 2020) <<https://www.suls.org.au/citations-blog/2020/8/28/the-posse-comitatus-act-its-reconstruction-era-roots-and-link-to-modern-racism>>. See also Allen Guelzo, *Reconstruction: A Concise History* (Oxford University Press 2018) and Daniel Byman, ‘White Supremacy, Terrorism, and the Failure of Reconstruction in the United States’, (2021) 46 (1) *International Security* 53–103, 84-85 <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00410>.

²⁰ Byman (n 19), 101.

²¹ ‘Christian Identity’, *Anti-Defamation League* (Web Page) <<https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/christian-identity>>

²² ‘Christian Identity’ (n 21).

²³ Devon Bell, ‘The Sovereign Citizen Movement: The Shifting Ideological Winds’ (MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 23-24.

²⁴ J M Berger, ‘Without Prejudice: What Sovereign Citizens Believe’ (Paper, George Washington University Program on Extremism, 2016).

²⁵ Bell (n 23), 7.

is no surprise that in 1987 Gale was convicted of tax offences and imprisoned. He died in jail in 1988 while his appeal was pending. Other so-called ‘tax protestors’ became integrated into the movement. From this fertile soil, the modern SovCit movement emerged.

‘Organised pseudolegal commercial arguments’

The SovCit movement is but one branch of the tree that is pseudolaw. Other branches include the ‘Freemen on the Land’ movement, found in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and parts of Europe, the ‘Detaxers’ of Canada and the ‘Moorish Sovereign Citizens’ of North America. This last group reflects an odd occurrence. Somewhere in the evolution of pseudolaw the racism and anti-Semitism inherent in the ideology was abandoned by some adherents.²⁶ The Moorish sovereign citizen movement is made up largely of African Americans who, it might be thought, would be surprised to learn the true origins of their belief system. There are some signs of comparable evolution in Australia, with suggestions of a SovCit ‘infiltration’ of the First Nations Sovereignty movement in Australia.²⁷ The Freeman movement is also something of an outlier. It is largely populated by a more left-leaning group whose motivation to resist the government comes from the opposite end of the political spectrum to ‘traditional’ sovereign citizens. From this we can infer that the pseudolaw ideology has wide appeal. Its tenets may be adopted even by those who would resist the more right-wing elements of the original ideology.

The rapid splintering and evolution of pseudolaw in the last 20 years is not unexpected. It has coincided with the explosion of instant communication fostered by the internet. An idea can be transmitted anywhere in the world. It can be replicated countless times on FaceBook and Reddit and Discord and Snapchat and TikTok and so on. As this happens, a type of natural selection occurs. The original idea is added to, changed, or misunderstood. A new and slightly different idea emerges. Some gain currency and are themselves replicated. Others wither and die. This process explains the existence of what Donald Netolitzky called ‘the mature Pseudolaw Memeplex’,²⁸ co-opting a term coined by Richard Dawkins nearly 50 years ago.²⁹ Netolitzky is a prolific author on the topic of pseudolaw. He holds the position of Complex Litigant Management Counsel at the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench. Netolitzky's background in microbiology was put to good use in his 2018 analysis of the development of pseudolaw.³⁰

In his paper, Netolitzky identified the rapid expansion of pseudolaw since the invention of the ‘Strawman’ concept in the late 1990s. He treated the analysis as one would trace viral infection, investigating

the transmission of the Pseudolaw Memeplex from the Sovereign Citizen community into different countries and populations. These ideas spread much like a disease, from host-to-host, accumulating adaptations that then facilitated new cycles of infection.³¹

²⁶ Michelle Mallek, ‘Uncommon Law: Understanding and Quantifying the Sovereign Citizen Movement’ (MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 24-25.

²⁷ Toni Hassan, ‘Who are the ‘Original Sovereigns’ who were camped out at Old Parliament House and what are their aims?’, *The Conversation* (online at 17 January 2022) < <https://theconversation.com/who-are-the-original-sovereigns-who-were-camped-out-at-old-parliament-house-and-what-are-their-aims-174694>>.

²⁸ Donald Netolitzky, ‘A Pathogen Astride the Minds of Men: The Epidemiological History of Pseudolaw’ (Conference Paper, CEFIR Symposium: Sovereign Citizens in Canada, 3 May 2018).

²⁹ Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene – 30th Anniversary Edition* (Oxford University Press, 2006), p 322. Dawkins invented the term ‘meme’ in the context of his argument that in any system, slightly inaccurate self-replicating entities are almost limitless drivers of evolution. ‘Meme’ has now entered the lexicon and is defined by the Macquarie dictionary online as ‘a cultural element, as a custom, concept, etc., which is passed on through time and across cultures by communication or imitation’.

³⁰ Netolitzky (n 28).

³¹ Netolitzky (n 28), 3.

Netolitzky noted that the international experience suggested that pseudolaw concepts were ‘acceptable to a diverse and in many ways incompatible range of counterculture and marginal groups.’³² His paper only permitted a superficial consideration of the transmission of pseudolaw to Australia. Even then, Netolitzky drew attention to the merging of idiosyncratic local pseudolaw concepts with imported ideas. One such ‘original’ Australia idea was the claim that the Constitution prohibited paper money propounded by Alan Skyring in the 1980s and 1990s. This claim, and Skyring’s associated claim that *Magna Carta (1215)* prohibits the award of costs in litigation, have been comprehensively dismissed by Australian courts.³³ Skyring has been declared a vexatious litigant in the High Court of Australia and the Supreme Court of Queensland. The ‘currency argument’ appears to have become an evolutionary dead end – the most recent attempt to agitate the theory was in 2011.³⁴ Reliance upon *Magna Carta* is, however, evergreen, as will be discussed below.

One of Netolitzky’s observations of the Australian pseudolaw landscape may, with the benefit of hindsight, appear to be overly optimistic.

Pseudolaw appears [to] have developed a firm presence in Australia and New Zealand, with a steady stream of reported decisions appearing in both jurisdictions. However, these concepts are apparently sequestered in a diverse collection of dissident groups and individuals. Currently, there is no basis to expect these ideas will expand outside this marginal host population base.³⁵

Around 2010 the American David Wynn Miller, a disciple of Gould and coinventor of quantum grammar was active in Australia. Miller was reported as touring Australian cities and regional centres where he charged students up to \$1,800 to attend his seminars. The Sydney Morning Herald approached Miller for comment. His response was

mostly incomprehensible. When asked about his Brisbane course ..., which costs \$1800 for six days, he wrote (in capital letters): ‘When people ask questions on the “deed of trust” as the trustee and cross-subject-questions, I give them the operational-answers that may help for them to do their own “learning-search”.’³⁶

During his time in Australia, Miller appeared in the New South Wales Land and Environment Court as agent for Dr Masood Falamaki.³⁷ Dr Falamaki had been involved in long-running litigation concerning a house he wished to build. At one point in the litigation Miller appeared before the Honourable Malcolm Craig QC, then a judge of the court. Miller deployed his ‘quantum grammar’. His submissions to the court included

MILLER: Conclusionary law not based on now time jurisdiction under rules of evidence are void for one thing. Two, I’ll give you a little secret. Every word that starts in the English language with a vowel, a, e, i, o and u and followed by two consonants is a word that means no contract. If you’re arguing a condition, a negative condition which can’t be proved under a seal which says syntax would be used in its correct format then the technology of writing will be syntaxed accordingly. The words will be identified for their true syntax and the value of that word will be brought to this court so if you have a rule our syntax can tell you exactly what it means frontwards

³² Netolitzky (n 28), 17.

³³ *Re: Skyring’s Application (No 2)* (1985) 59 ALJR 561; *Re: Skyring* (1994) 68 ALJR 618; and *Skyring v ANZ Banking Group Limited* [1994] QCA 143 to select just three examples of Skyring’s unsuccessful litigation.

³⁴ *Kosteska v Phillips; Kosteska v Commissioner of Police* [2011] QCA 266. It appears that Skyring was being this litigation despite being a vexatious litigant.

³⁵ Netolitzky (n 28), 17.

³⁶ Natasha Wallace, “‘Messiah-like figure’ is doing own harvesting”, *Sydney Morning Herald* (online at 15 January 2011) <<https://www.smh.com.au/world/messiahlike-figure-is-doing-own-harvesting-20110114-19r9v.html>>.

³⁷ *Woolongong City Council v Dr Masood Falamaki* [2010] NSWLEC 66.

and backwards because the order of operations of syntax are one and the same planet- wide in all five thousand languages, just like as a track multiplying and dividing for the operations of numbers. It is universal communication issues.

...

When I was invited to this case I looked at the paperwork and I said, this is all wrong, it's impossible for a case to run as long as it has but because that nothing has been said, I said show me the first piece of paper, the first day of trial and when that first day of trial was handed to me I said I syntaxed it and said it's in a box, it's written in adverb/verb, there's no correct sentence structure, therefore it's mute. If you build a case on a lie, it's a lie.

Exercising considerable restraint, Craig J observed, 'Regrettably, I did not find the submissions helpful in addressing Dr Falamaki's claim'.³⁸ Miller returned to North America and, it is reported, died in 2019, some time after being 'court martialled' by Gould and stripped of his post as 'plenipotentiary (sic) judge'.³⁹

Courts around the world continued to deal with pseudolaw arguments as they popped up. There was little opportunity for any kind of comprehensive analysis of the disparate claims presented by pseudolaw adherents. Appellate courts often dismissed the more spurious claims summarily. Then in 2012 a Canadian judge sitting at first instance heard a case management application in a divorce matter. The husband was representing himself. He was known in the proceeding as Dennis Larry Meads, but preferred to style himself as '::Dennis-Larry: Meads::'. The result of the application was an order that the matter be referred to case management, and a seminal 736-paragraph judgment responding to the collection of pseudolaw documents and arguments presented by Meads.⁴⁰ The decision in *Meads* is a rare example of a 'rock-star' decision – each year between 2012 and 2019 it has been among the top three most accessed decision on CanLII.⁴¹ Associate Chief Justice John D Rooke considered, analysed, and debunked a wide range of pseudolaw concepts. He also coined the phrase 'organised pseudolegal commercial arguments' (OPCA) to describe the range of arguments presented by pseudolaw adherents. At the time of its publication in September 2012, *Meads* represented a comprehensive survey of pseudolaw in Canada (and by extension much of the common law world).

Pseudolaw evolves, but it also remains rooted in key concepts that appear relatively unchanging.⁴² The decision in *Meads* deals with many of these concepts and provides a 'toolkit of examples and explanations for what has been encountered to date, and the responses that have (or have not) worked'.⁴³ OPCA communities in Canada have largely failed to respond to *Meads*. At best some OPCA 'gurus' deny the validity of the decision without proffering any basis for this conclusion.⁴⁴ I am unaware of any attempts by Australian pseudolaw adherents to confront the decision in *Meads*. They are probably largely unaware of the decision. Of course, Canadian law and the Canadian experience is different to Australia. But the decision in *Meads* is still of real assistance to Australian trial courts when responding to the claims of pseudolaw adherents.

³⁸ *Woolongong City Council v Dr Masood Falamki* [2010] NSWLEC 66, [37].

³⁹ Donald Netolitzky, 'Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments as magic and ceremony' (2018) 55 (4) *Alberta Law Review*, 1062.

⁴⁰ *Meads v Meads* 2012 ABQB 571 (*Meads*).

⁴¹ Donald Netolitzky, 'After the Hammer: Six Years of *Meads v Meads*' (2019) 56(4) *Alberta Law Review*, 1167-1207 <<https://doi.org/10.29173/alr2548>>.

⁴² Netolitzky (n 39), 1046.

⁴³ Netolitzky (n 41), 1205.

⁴⁴ Netolitzky (n 41), 1192.

What, then, are the more common beliefs and claims a court might encounter when confronted with a pseudolaw adherent?

The culture of pseudolaw – a kind of magic?

Ritual and ceremony have long been at the heart of pseudolaw ideology. Documents are marked with sigils and signs.⁴⁵ Written submissions bear the appearance of incantations. Statutes are parsed to discover hidden meaning and codes. It is unsurprising then that pseudolaw has been likened to magic.⁴⁶ Netolitzky has written that the Pseudolaw Memplex has at its core six concepts:⁴⁷

1. Everything is a contract,
2. Silence means acceptance or agreement,
3. Legal action requires that there be an ‘injured party’,
4. Government authority is defective or at least limited,
5. The ‘Strawman’ duality, and
6. Financial and banking conspiracy theories.

Most of these concepts are much the same wherever they are found in the world. The fourth is adapted to suit local conditions and legal history. The fifth concept is in some ways the apotheosis of pseudolegal theory and is perhaps the most encountered in the courts. As may be seen, each concept is based in conspiracy narratives and the belief that pseudolaw adherents know something the rest of society does not.

Everything is a contract and silence means consent

These two concepts are linked. The first is derived from the idea that no state authority can be imposed on an individual without consent. That is, the ‘social contract’ is not given effect by some collective decision of society at, say, an election, but rather requires individual consent. It follows that it is possible for individuals to achieve immunity from the state by denying the existence of a ‘contract’ or by renouncing the agreement. Under this theory practically any state issued document (birth certificates, driver licence, etc) can be evidence of the contract. OPCA litigants may go to great lengths to disavow or repudiate such documents.⁴⁸ Returning or surrendering a birth certificate is common.⁴⁹ This is done because otherwise the silence of the OPCA litigant in the face of government documents may be taken as their consent to the ‘contract’ – the idea that silence equals consent.

There is a basis for belief in this second concept, but it is one that reflects a fundamental misunderstanding. *Black’s Law Dictionary* is a favourite of the North American SovCit. Dealing with the rules of pleading, an early edition set out the Latin maxim *qui non negat fatetur*, which roughly translates as ‘Those who do not deny, admit.’ Pseudolaw theory took this maxim and from it developed the notion that it is possible for contracts to be imposed or foisted upon individuals. The premise is flawed. The full passage in *Black’s Law Dictionary* goes on ‘He who does not deny, admits. A well known rule of pleading.’ It is clear this is not a statement of the law of contract. It is a rule of pleading that exists today.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ *R v Sweet* [2021] QDC 216, [5] (*Sweet*).

⁴⁶ Netolitzky (n 39), 1049.

⁴⁷ Donald Netolitzky, ‘A Rebellion of Furious Paper: Pseudolaw as a Revolutionary Legal System’ (Conference Paper, CEFIR Symposium: Sovereign Citizens in Canada, 3 May 2018).

⁴⁸ *Meads*, [395]-[396].

⁴⁹ For example, *Sweet*, [4].

⁵⁰ *Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999* (Qld), rule 166.

These two elements come together to explain some actions of pseudolaw adherents. One is the so-called ‘fee schedule’. These are documents that might be given to a police officer during a traffic stop and which assert that by talking to the SovCit the police officer enters a contract and is obligated to pay some exorbitant sum of money. Less commonly such documents are given to judicial officers. They are obviously meaningless and may easily be disposed of with the application of conventional principles of contract law. The claim that an individual must consent to the application of state authority is also obviously wrong, but it is more difficult to explain why that is so to a determined OPCA litigant. A courtroom is not a suitable place for a descent into political theory and ideas of collective consent. Nor is this paper. It is, I think, sufficient to note that it is accepted reality that as a society we collectively admit the authority of the state. A litigant who challenges that reality bears the burden of proving, in a manner decipherable to the court, why their claim should prevail. Absent such proof, the litigant will remain subject to the law.

Legal action requires that there be an ‘injured party’ and financial conspiracies

The ‘no injured party’ theory is one that derives from William Potter Gale’s version of god-given common law. It is god’s rule that one should not harm another or their property. This ‘rule’ has been transmuted into a requirement for proof of harm to a person or property before the law can intervene. It follows (conveniently) that so-called victimless crimes – such as producing cannabis or driving without a licence – cannot be prosecuted. The theory may be seen as an extension of libertarianism. Whatever its merits as a political theory, it does not represent the law of Queensland or Australia, where parliament legislates to denote certain conduct as criminal or otherwise, and the executive and the courts enforce this legislation. As far as my research has taken me, I have not found any Australian pseudolaw adherents relying directly upon this idea.

The same may be said of various fiscal conspiracy theories that are found overseas. They may underpin claims such as the currency argument, but do not seem to be deployed as free-standing arguments in Australian courts. An example is the conspiracy theory based on the modern economic practice by which banks might loan an amount greater than the money they hold as deposits. This is said to be creating money out of ‘thin air’, confirming that paper money is not real and creating no obligation in the borrower to repay this ‘fake money’. Another idea is connected with the Strawman. It is said that at birth, governments ‘mortgage’ the value of a person to secure funds. Once one knows this, and how to revoke the ‘contract’ evidenced by one’s birth certificate the arrangement can be voided, and the person may claim the funds.⁵¹ The attraction of the theory was pithily summarised by Rooke ACJ in *Meads*.

These are the proverbial caves of hidden treasure. OPCA gurus who advance these concepts claim that, with the correct combination of documents, one can open a secret path to vast riches. One needs only know the spell!⁵²

The application of this theory is more likely to be an issue for the executive government rather than the courts. I am unaware of any suits brought before the courts claiming money on this basis.

Government authority is defective

This is one area where pseudolaw theory shows significant regional variation. In the United States the lack of state authority is said to derive, variously, from the citizenship clause of the

⁵¹ *Meads* [532]-[536].

⁵² *Meads* [530].

14th amendment⁵³ or from the bankruptcy discussed earlier in this paper. Moorish law adherents believe government illegitimacy stems from the Moroccan American Treaty of Friendship of 1786 and the subsequent events of the First Barbary War. In Germany the Reichsbürger movement offers several different theories, including that the Third Reich did not surrender at the end of World War Two (they claim only the army surrendered) and that the Allied occupation which began in May 1945 never ended.⁵⁴ As we are concerned with Australian law there is no need to discuss how courts in these countries respond to the claims.

In Australia there have been three broad arguments run to support the claim that government authority is illegitimate or deficient. The first, the ‘currency argument’, has been mentioned and must now be considered wholly discredited. Another argument centres on what is said to be the invalidity of constitutional legislation with the result that almost all state authority is without foundation. The argument has taken slightly different forms but reached its peak in *Sharpley v Arnison*.⁵⁵ The argument was later summarised in these terms:

The appellant’s argument runs as follows. The *Australia Acts (Request) Act 1985* (Qld), an Act of the Queensland Parliament, which preceded the *Australia Act 1986* (UK) of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, was not preceded by a referendum. That was contrary to the requirements of s 53 of the *Queensland Constitution Act 1867* (Qld) which, because the Queensland Act anticipated alterations to the office of Governor, necessitated a precedent referendum.⁵⁶

In *Sharpley* McPherson JA demonstrated the many flaws in the argument. While others attempted to revive the argument in the decade that followed, it too appears to have gone the way of the ‘currency argument’.⁵⁷

Magna Carta is a different creature. Its historical and cultural significance is such that it still bobs up from time to time, usually in purported support of arguments that all litigation must be tried by juries or that it is unlawful to levy taxes. Of course, any invocation of *Magna Carta* must be met with the question, ‘Which one?’⁵⁸ The 1215 settlement between King John and his barons that was repudiated within months? The revival of 1216 that was an attempt to garner support for John’s infant heir? The charters of 1217 or 1225? Or the version confirmed by Edward I and which entered English, and subsequently Australian, statute books in 1297? It would be surprising if many of the people who attribute great significance to *Magna Carta* were aware of its history. It is enough for them to ‘cherry pick’ apparently helpful sections, such as the famous chapter 39 (or 29 depending on the version):

No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, liberties or free customs, or be outlawed or exiled or in any other wise destroyed; nor will We pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.

As interesting as it may be, in the end, none of this much matters. As was explained by Chesterman J in *Carnes v Essenberg*,⁵⁹ while *Magna Carta* was incorporated into Australian law the Imperial parliament and, consequently, Australian parliaments were empowered to amend or repeal its provisions. The result is that legislation that is inconsistent with any of

⁵³ Netolitzky (n 47), 14.

⁵⁴ Netolitzky (n 47), 15.

⁵⁵ [2001] QCA 518; [2002] 2 Qd R 444.

⁵⁶ *Clampett v Hill & Ors* [2007] QCA 394, [13].

⁵⁷ *Clampett v Hill & Ors* [2007] QCA 394; *Clampett v Wensley & Ors* [2009] QCA 277; and *Lohe v Gunter* [2003] QSC 150.

⁵⁸ Frederick Maitland, the ‘father of English legal history’, wrote more than a century ago, ‘It is never enough to refer to Magna Carta without saying which edition you mean.’: F. W. Maitland, *The Constitutional History of England* (Cambridge Uni Press, 1908), 15

⁵⁹ [1999] QCA 33.

Magna Carta's 'liberties' may be taken to have impliedly or expressly repealed them.⁶⁰ Whatever the Great Charter's historical significance,⁶¹ it cannot be said to be a piece of functioning legislation that determines rights and obligations today.

The Strawman duality

That leaves the ultimate expression of pseudolaw theory – the 'Strawman duality'. It is here that pseudolaw theory becomes its most magical.

While there are some variations of detail, the essence of the Strawman duality remains as summarised by Netolitzky:⁶²

1. Physical humans are bound or linked to a non-physical legal person doppelganger: the "Strawman".
2. Government has inherent authority over the non-corporeal "Strawman" doppelganger, but not a human being. The link between the physical and legal parts of the duality is a channel for government authority.
3. The government attaches the "Strawman" to the physical human via a concealed contract that involves birth or identification documentation.
4. The "Strawman" is identified by an all upper-case letter name (e.g. JOHN SMITH), and that is why government and legal documentation capitalizes names. Those materials do not actually refer to the associated human being.
5. Government authority can be negated by denying you are the "Strawman", and/or by breaking the "Strawman" contract.
6. A human is only subject to "Common Law" once the "Strawman" is removed.

It can be seen how this theory builds on other pseudolaw concepts. The legal being is attached to one's corporeal being as a result of a contract. The contract is evidenced by documents such as a birth certificate. The authority of the state over an individual is limited and depends on the existence of this contract. Once the contract has been revoked, the state can no longer exercise authority over the individual. The supernatural overtones of the theory are obvious. As Netolitzky recognised,⁶³ there are parallels with demonic possession and exorcism. The Strawman is an unwelcome intruder to be banished through the ceremonial revocation of, say, a birth certificate. This is achieved by marking a copy of the certificate with fingerprints, stamps, or other marks. Ritual phrases are invoked and, perhaps, the recission is sealed by the offer of a coin.

The attraction of the Strawman ideal is that it provides the solution to every problem a pseudolaw adherent may face. Any debt or liability stays with the Strawman, who is jettisoned by the real person. The real person need not be troubled by matters like taxation, or the inconvenience of licenses or permits, because the state has no authority over the real person. Similarly, the criminal law has no reach over them.

It would be very difficult to convince those who truly believe in these ideas that they are wrong, as are the conspiracy theories that provide their foundation. But conventional legal theory is enough to demonstrate why the law cannot countenance the existence of a human being without

⁶⁰ By reason of the *Imperial Acts Application Act 1984* (Qld), there are only three clauses that remain in force in Queensland. One is clause 29. The others are clauses 1 and 9, which are concerned with the Church of England and the City of London.

⁶¹ For just two analyses of the historical significance of *Magna Carta* see Paul Brand, 'Magna Carta and the Development of the Common Law' (Paper, High Court Public Lecture series, 13 May 2015) and James Spigelman, 'Magna Carta in its Medieval Context' (Address, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 22 April 2015).

⁶² Netolitzky (n 47), 15-16.

⁶³ Netolitzky (n 39), 1076.

a legal personality. As much as the law might impose obligations upon a person, it also attaches to them rights. To be subject to the law is to have the benefit of the latter, while also being bound by the former. Since as long ago as the 18th century, the common law set itself against the notion that there existed classes of human beings who were mere property and possessed no legal personality.⁶⁴ Neither the common nor statute law of Australia permits a human being to be considered property. Yet that would be the consequence of the Strawman duality. The result of the divorce of the legal and real persons would be a human being without rights. Someone who was no more than a chattel. Such an outcome could not be tolerated in modern society.

As for the application of the Queensland criminal law, further considerations arise. These were dealt with by me in *R v Sweet* where I wrote:⁶⁵

The Criminal Code provides in section 7:

- (1) When an offence is committed, each of the following persons is deemed to have taken part in committing the offence and to be guilty of the offence, and may be charged with actually committing it, that is to say
 - (a) every person who actually does the act or makes the omission which constitutes the offence ...

An ‘offence’ is defined by section 2 to be:

an act or omission which renders the person doing the act or omission liable to punishment ...

Criminal liability attaches to a person where they ‘do the act or one or more acts in a series which constitutes or constitute the offence’.⁶⁶ On any view of the present allegations, that could not be the ‘straw man’ or ‘dummy corporation’ mentioned by the applicant. The applicant’s own writings describe this purported alternate persona as ‘an artificial person’, a ‘legal entity’, ‘an artificial legal person’ and a ‘legal fiction’. Even if it existed in law, it is not capable of doing the act or acts that attract criminal liability. Of the two entities claimed by the applicant to exist – the applicant as ‘a real live flesh and blood man’ and the ‘straw man’ – the only one who could have done the acts that constitute the offences is the applicant, constituted in the corporeal form of the person who appeared in court to make this application. That is the person who was charged by the police, committed to stand trial by a Magistrate and against whom the present indictment was presented. That person is subject to the criminal law of this State and may be found to be criminally liable for his own acts. Even if the applicant possesses a ‘legal split-personality’, a proposition I reject, it could not alter this reality.

There is no room for doubt or confusion as to who is said to have done the criminal acts and who is to stand trial in relation to the allegations. That is the applicant. His apparent wish to be identified by a name that is different to the name he was assigned at birth is of no moment at all.⁶⁷ However he is known, and no matter how odd the punctuation, he

⁶⁴ For example, *Somerset v Stewart* (1772) 98 ER 499, a decision in which Lord Mansfield ordered the discharge of a slave pursuant to a writ of *habeus corpus*, uttering (as he also did in *R v Wilkes* (1770) 4 Burr 2527 at 2561-2562 [98 ER 327 at 346-347]) the phrase ‘*fiat justitia, ruat cælum*, let justice be done whatever be the consequence’.

⁶⁵ *Sweet*, [7]-[10].

⁶⁶ *R v Wyles; ex-parte A-G* [1977] Qd R 169, Lucas J at 177. See also *Barlow v The Queen* (1997) 188 CLR 1, Brennan CJ, Dawson & Toohey JJ at 9.

⁶⁷ If there is a claim that a defendant is wrongly named in the indictment the remedy is to be found in section 597 of the *Criminal Code*.

remains the same person – the one alleged to have committed the offences charged in the indictment.

While the so called ‘straw man’ argument may properly be described as nonsense or gobbledygook,⁶⁸ it is in any event of no assistance to the applicant in present circumstances. It is to my mind clear that under the criminal law of Queensland the applicant’s claim to possess or be associated with some separate legal entity is entirely irrelevant.

That knowledge of the name or even legal status of the defendant is not essential to attract criminal liability is confirmed in the decision of *R v Murrell and Bummaree* (1836) 1 Legge 72 (the case of ‘Jack Congo Murrell’), where it was held that the criminal law applied to an Aboriginal man who, at the time, would have had no other legal rights.

The above may be sufficient to satiate an inquisitive appellate court. But it is of little use to a judicial officer faced with a defendant in a criminal proceeding who will not answer to their name. The difficulty arises where a person appears before the court in response to the matter being called but then denies that their name is as alleged in the charge.⁶⁹ Faced with this difficulty it is tempting to accede to a prosecution submission to treat the defendant as not appearing and deal with the matter *ex-parte*. This certainly has occurred in the past but may amount to a flawed approach when it is obvious that the person before the court is the person charged with the offence.⁷⁰

A different approach would be to rely upon the implied power of the Magistrates Court to regulate its own procedure. Assuming the proceeding relates to a simple offence or breach of duty, the court may hear and determine the complaint if it is satisfied that both parties appear in person or by their lawyers.⁷¹ The provisions of Part 6, Division 3 of the *Justices Act 1886* (Qld) would then be engaged. The Act does not expressly make provision for determining if a person appearing before the court is a person named in a charge. But in *Power v Heyward*,⁷² Byrne J held that

A Magistrates Court has, by implication, the powers reasonably necessary to enable it to act effectively within its jurisdiction’. The more important of these are, ‘subject to the rules of Court and to statute, to regulate its own procedure, to ensure fairness in investigative and trial procedures...’, and to prevent an abuse of its process.⁷³

This passage has been followed in the Supreme Court,⁷⁴ and cited with apparent approval in the Court of Appeal.⁷⁵

⁶⁸ As it has been in *Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Casley* [2017] WASC 161, [15]; *Smadu v Stone* [2016] WASC 80, [5]; *Re Magistrate M M Flynn; ex parte McJannett* [2013] WASC 372, [14]-[15].

⁶⁹ The assertion may be that name in the charge is expressed in capital letters and therefore refers to the Strawman or dummy corporation rather than the real person. Incidentally, the purported significance of capitalisation seems to be derived from the *Chicago Manual of Style*, 16th ed., at 16.89, which stipulates that corporations should be named using capital letters.

⁷⁰ *Hainaut v Queensland Police Service* [2017] QDC 208 and *Hainaut v Queensland Police Service* [2019] QDC 223 are two examples.

⁷¹ *Justices Act 1886* (Qld), section 144.

⁷² [2007] 2 Qd R 69.

⁷³ *Ibid*, [16] (footnotes omitted).

⁷⁴ *Thiess Pty Ltd v Industrial Magistrate Elizabeth Hall & Ors* [2013] QSC 130, [26], a decision of Boddice J that was confirmed on appeal in *Thiess Pty Ltd v Industrial Magistrate Elizabeth Hall & Ors* [2014] QCA 129.

⁷⁵ *Upton v Commissioner of Police* [2012] QCA 88.

It is open, I think, to a Magistrate to conduct, as a preliminary matter, an inquiry to establish if the person before the court is the defendant.⁷⁶ This may be as simple as taking evidence from the police officer who charged the defendant, or issued them with a notice to appear, to confirm the person before the court is that person. If the court is satisfied that the person appearing before it is the defendant that is sufficient to engage Part 6, Division 3 of the Act and it would not matter that the name in the charge is different to the defendant's preferred name. There is no requirement that the name in the charge must be a defendant's name as registered at birth, or their name in any other formal or legal sense. There is a long history of the use of common names or even aliases in charges and on indictment.⁷⁷ The name of the defendant is of less importance than ensuring it is the defendant who appears before the court. Once the court is satisfied of the latter its jurisdiction is engaged, and it can proceed to hear and determine the charge.

Dealing with the OPCA litigant

Of course, the process of dealing with a proponent of pseudolaw may sometimes be challenging. The same can be said of all litigants in person. Two concerns are raised. First, how to respond to the litigant in court, and secondly, how might the courts as an institution respond.

Responding to the OPCA litigant in court

Dealing with an OPCA litigant in court must begin with an attempt to understand what has driven them to the position they are in. What is their motivation for embracing pseudolaw? Often the answer is the same. They are persons who feel they are disenfranchised or marginalised. They are in a position of relative disadvantage in society and pseudolaw presents an opportunity to take control. Pseudolaw is the 'inside knowledge' that permits the OPCA litigant to command a power kept secret from others. Such can drive some litigants into a fervent, if not febrile, pursuit of what they perceive as 'justice'.

There is, I suspect, a substantial overlap between OPCA litigants and the category of litigants in person described as querulous or vexatious. The latter has been the subject of much investigation in recent years, especially through the lens of psychiatry. Dr Grant Lester describes the 'normal' complainant as one who believes they have experienced a loss but who maintain perspective and are able to evaluate the loss compared to the effort required to seek redress.⁷⁸ In contrast

[t]he 'difficult' complainant also believes that they have experienced a loss. This complainant will generally attribute loss to external causes and become not only aggrieved but also, to varying degrees, indignant. This is because, cognitively, their egocentric view of the world centralises their own importance and devalues and dehumanises others. There are distinct themes of victimisation. Hence they feel angry, innocent of responsibility and a victim of an unjust act.

It would surprise no one to learn that querulous litigants are largely male, middle-aged and white. Dr Lester surmises that such persons can be primed to become vexatious. These people are aging. They face mortality and perhaps a sense of failing to accomplish goals. Add to this some insult or loss and the relentless pursuit of an idiosyncratic idea of justice becomes the way they seek to prove their worth as a person.

⁷⁶ A term defined in section 4 of the *Justices Act 1886* (Qld) as 'a person complained against before a Magistrates Court or before justices for a simple offence, breach of duty or an indictable offence'.

⁷⁷ A well-known example is *Tuckiar v The King* [1934] HCA 49, (1934) 52 CLR 335 concerning the prosecution of a Yolngu man whose name, Dhakiyarr Wirrpanda, was anglicised to Tuckiar.

⁷⁸ Grant Lester, 'The Vexatious Litigant', (2005) 17(3) *Judicial Officers' Bulletin* <<https://aija.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Lester1.pdf>>.

Dr Lester has developed some guidelines for dealing with querulous or vexatious litigants that apply equally to OPCA litigants. Paraphrased, they are:

1. 'First do no harm.' By adopting this aphorism Dr Lester means you must realise that you are unlikely to be able to satisfy the litigant or persuade them they are wrong. Instead, the aim should be containment and to avoid making the litigation more difficult.
2. Be prepared for the 'six Vs'. This refers to the tendency of such litigants to be *volatile*, to feel *victimised*, to seek *vindication*, to produce *voluminous* and *vague* written and oral submissions and to *vary* their demands.
3. Maintain formality and boundaries. Adherence to rules and procedures will assist in the aim of containment. Ensuring formality may assist in emphasising the authority of the court and its role in impartially deciding the contest between the parties.
4. Recognise that the litigants may appear hyper-competent, with masses of cases and documents, but they are in truth overwhelmed by the court process. Remember, as well, the obligation of judicial officers to ensure fairness where one party at least is not represented.⁷⁹
5. Maintain focus. The OPCA litigant may have the tendency to be discursive. It will help to intervene when this occurs to keep the discussion on track. The same applies to judicial officers as well who should avoid jumping around from topic to topic.
6. Control through limits. Set boundaries and limits at the start of the hearing. Let the litigant know the order in which you will hear from the parties and the topics that need to be addressed. Where appropriate, set time limits.
7. Silence is golden. Sometimes it is best to let the litigant say what they want without interruption, at least within sensible limits. Interventions from the bench may only add delay and confusion.
8. Keep a thick skin and do not personalise the encounter. Some litigants will be disrespectful or outright rude. For conduct that falls short of actual contempt in the face of the court, it is best to ignore the rhetoric and attempt to get to the real issue before the court.

To these guidelines I would add my own. Be patient and polite to the extent that is possible. Avoid arguing with the OPCA litigant. Do not be smug, arrogant, or dismissive. An intemperate or impatient response will make the situation more volatile and is not in keeping with the judicial oath to 'do right by all manner of people'. Finally, wherever possible, prepare! This is not always possible. But when it is, time should be spent examining the material filed by the OPCA litigant to identify what beliefs they may be espousing. This will greatly assist in identifying an appropriate response to the claims that are advanced.

Institutional response

The issue of what might be the institutional response of the courts is a broad and difficult one. If some response is to be developed it will be for the courts to decide having received appropriate input from judicial officers and others. On the civil side that response might include a greater role for the registry and the rules of court to assist in 'gatekeeping' at an early stage.

⁷⁹ *Neil v Nott* (1994) 121 ALR 148, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, 150; [1994] HCA 23; *Abram v Bank of New Zealand* [1996] ATPR 41-507, 42-341, 42-347, Hill, Tamberlin and Sundberg JJ; [1996] FCA 1650; *Jeray v Blue Mountains City Council (No 2)* [2010] NSWCA 367, Allsop P, MacFarlan and Young JJA, [8]-[12]; *Panagiotopoulos v Rajendram* [2005] NSWCA 58, Pearlman AJA, [33] with Mason P, Hodgson JA agreeing, [1]-[2]; and *Tomasevic v Travaglini* (2007) 17 VR 100, [138]-[143]; [2007] VSC 337.

For example, documents that do not conform to the requirements of the *Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999* (Qld) might not be accepted for filing. In this way some unmeritorious claims may be identified and perhaps abandoned by the litigant. On the criminal side there is less that might be done. A defendant in a criminal proceeding is not in court by their own choice, and the imbalance of power between the state and individual means caution must be exercised before summarily dismissing the complaints of a defendant. I repeat that preparation and research may provide at least part of the answer for the courts when dealing with OPCA litigants. There is a very substantial body of academic literature available for review, some of which is listed in a bibliography to this paper.

Conclusion

In 2018 Donald Netolitzky wrote

The Pseudolaw Memplex's function is to subvert state and institutional authority, so that sets the limit of where these ideas will encounter vulnerable potential hosts. So far, that has been the outskirts of society. Could that change? Perhaps. The Pseudolaw Memplex is a tool of (pseudo)legal revolt. Would these ideas become more broadly acceptable if the public concludes government and its institutions are illegitimate? ...

This disease of ideas is obviously potent and adaptable ... [A] new process is underway: hybridization. Formerly isolated regional pseudolaw strains are increasingly shared as a common language of pseudolaw permeates online communities. Will this intermingling provide new adaptive motifs, or solidify pseudolaw as a monolith, a third global system of law? Only time will tell.⁸⁰

Since then, we have seen a global pandemic and with it increasing societal challenge to the legitimacy of government authority around the world. We have also seen the violent insurrection of 6 January 2021 when terrorists⁸¹ attempted to overturn the results of the United States Presidential election. The derision of government institutions and authority continues apace, sometime fomented by those on the inside. Mobile telephones, the internet, and social media allow ideas to be transmitted more rapidly than even before. It would be naïve to think that there will not be an increase in OPCA litigants challenging matters in the courts.

It is our responsibility to be prepared.

⁸⁰ Netolitzky (n 28), 18.

⁸¹ As they would be properly described according to the definitions in the *Criminal Code 1995* (Cth).

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