At first glance, Australia’s new online safety laws sound comforting.
Protect children. Reduce harm. Make the internet safer.
Who wouldn’t support that?
But when you step into the actual wording of the Online Safety Act 2021, particularly sections 63C and 63D, a much deeper shift comes into focus. This legislation is not only about children. It is not only about safety. It is about how digital spaces themselves are defined, controlled, and enforced.
This Act does not simply regulate online content.
It decides who gets access, who is allowed to participate, and what systems platforms must build to comply with government requirements.
It doesn’t tweak the internet.
It re-engineers it.
Let’s walk through what this legislation really means.
Executive Control Built into the Wording
The wording of this Act is deliberate.
It centralises decision-making power in the hands of the Minister and the eSafety Commissioner, granting them broad authority to determine which platforms are regulated, which are excluded, and what compliance looks like in practice.
Through legislative rules and regulatory guidance, they are empowered to restrict access, impose technical requirements, and shut down or reshape social spaces, without returning to Parliament for new legislation.
Who may participate online, under what conditions, and on which platforms is no longer determined by open use or community norms, but by the policy priorities of the government of the day.
This is not neutral regulation.
It is executive control of social space.
It places the architecture of online interaction directly under government authority.
The Definition That Brings Platforms Under Control (Section 63C)
Control begins with definition.
Section 63C determines what the law calls an “age-restricted social media platform.” This definition is the gateway. Once a service falls within it, the enforcement powers in section 63D automatically apply.
A platform is captured if it:
- exists for the sole or significant purpose of enabling online social interaction
- allows users to interact with one another
- allows users to post material
This definition is deliberately broad.
A platform does not need to identify as “social media.”
It does not need to be large, commercial, or mainstream.
It only needs social interaction to be a meaningful part of its function.
Community forums, discussion platforms, comment-based sites, group spaces, and emerging applications can all fall within scope.
The critical phrase is “significant purpose.”
The Act does not define it.
It does not limit it.
It leaves its interpretation open.
Advertising and revenue generation are expressly disregarded, meaning a platform cannot avoid regulation by claiming its purpose is primarily commercial rather than social.
Once captured, a service is no longer just a website.
It becomes a regulated social space.
Ministerial Power to Expand or Exclude
Section 63C does not lock this definition in place.
Instead, it allows the Minister, advised by the eSafety Commissioner, to expand or narrow the category through legislative rules.
No amendment to the Act is required.
No new parliamentary debate is required.
Which platforms are regulated, and when that status changes, is determined administratively.
This is not incidental drafting.
It is structural.
Enforcement Begins Where Definition Ends (Section 63D)
Once a platform is captured by section 63C, section 63D applies automatically.
A provider must take reasonable steps to prevent age-restricted users from having accounts.
The Act does not define what those steps must be.
Instead, their meaning is shaped by regulatory guidance, enforcement practice, and risk tolerance over time. What is considered reasonable today may be considered insufficient tomorrow.
The obligation is not advisory.
It is preventative.
To meet it, platforms must be able to determine age, verify that determination, and enforce exclusion. Self-declaration and warning prompts are not defensible under enforcement scrutiny.
As a result, “reasonable steps” inevitably point toward:
- age and identity verification
- proof-of-age systems
- monitoring and enforcement mechanisms
Not because the Act explicitly mandates them, but because the risk of failing to do so is too great.
The Role of Financial Pressure
Section 63D attaches a civil penalty of 30,000 penalty units per breach.
Under Australian Commonwealth law, one penalty unit equals AUD $330, making the maximum penalty AUD $9.9 million for each breach.
At this level, compliance stops being a matter of judgment or principle.
It becomes a risk-management exercise.
Platforms are no longer deciding what is fair or proportionate for their communities. They are deciding what will protect them from enforcement action that carries the power to cripple or effectively shut down any platform the government of the day chooses to focus on.
That pressure does the work long before any regulator intervenes.
Decision-making shifts away from users and communities and toward legal, compliance, and risk teams, whose task is to anticipate and satisfy government expectations.
The result is predictable.
Access becomes conditional.
Participation becomes monitored.
Digital spaces become controlled environments by design.
Targeted Pressure, Not Universal Application
In practice, the application of this framework is not uniform.
The scope of the Act is shaped through ministerial discretion, legislative rules, and enforcement priorities. Platforms may be brought into scope, retained there, or excluded entirely without further parliamentary scrutiny.
Where a platform is singled out for enforcement attention, the financial exposure is existential. Repeated penalties at this scale are unsustainable.
This allows the government to apply targeted regulatory pressure capable of restricting, reshaping, or neutralising particular platforms without formal bans, shutdown orders, or overt censorship.
Control is exercised quietly.
Selectively.
Through compliance pressure rather than prohibition.
Not by silencing speech directly, but by making independent operation economically impossible.
The High Court: The Only Pathway for Challenge
In Australia, the High Court of Australia is the only court with authority to invalidate Commonwealth legislation.
No tribunal, regulator, or lower court can strike down a federal Act. They may interpret it or apply it, but they cannot declare it invalid.
If the Online Safety Act 2021 is to be restrained or set aside on constitutional grounds, it can only occur through the High Court.
That places the sole meaningful safeguard against federal overreach in a forum that is complex, expensive, and largely inaccessible to ordinary Australians.
Why I Have Taken This Step
As a self-represented litigant in the High Court of Australia, I have commenced proceedings in relation to the Online Safety Act 2021.
I have done so because I am genuinely concerned about the potential harm this Act can cause. As an Australian who cares about my community, I did not take this step lightly. The consequences of this legislation extend beyond policy and into everyday participation in digital life. When laws reshape who may speak, participate, or operate in shared social spaces, the impact is real and far-reaching.
Taking action in the High Court is a daunting task, particularly without legal representation. Nevertheless, I am prepared to take that stand. Section 75(v) of the Constitution provides an avenue of remedy where Commonwealth power is exercised in a way that warrants constitutional scrutiny.
I take this stand in the interests of accountability, and for the community this law affects.
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