THE ASSOCIATE: In the Supreme Court of Western Australia, calling SJA/1029 of 2024, Kelly v The WA Police.
WHITBY J: Yes. I will hear from the appellant first.
KELLY, MS: Thank you. I’m requesting a support – somebody as support. Just feeling quite a little bit nervous today.
WHITBY J: All right. First of all, how would you like to be addressed?
KELLY, MS: Dawn, thank you.
WHITBY J: All right. You can have someone sit behind you, just with the solicitors.
KELLY, MS: Thank you. Neil doesn’t have to be – he’s outside. Can someone grab him, please. So, obviously, clearly not supportive at the moment.
WHITBY J: No.
KELLY, MS: Can somebody sit until he gets here?
WHITBY J: All right. Thank you, Dawn. You can have a seat. Yes.
MAYNE, MR: Mayne, I appear for the respondent.
WHITBY J: Thank you, Mr Mayne. I will just wait till you have somebody there, if you like.
KELLY, MS: Could I ask you – – –
WHITBY J: Yes.
KELLY, MS: You mentioned that it’s the WA Police.
WHITBY J: Yes.
KELLY, MS: But it’s – I’m confused with the – who’s here. For example, it was listed as Kelly versus Banner.
WHITBY J: Yes.
KELLY, MS: And so is it Kelly versus Banner or is it the WA Police?
WHITBY J: It’s the WA Police. P.2.
THE ASSOCIATE: In the Supreme Court of Western Australia, calling SJA/1029 of 2024, Kelly v The WA Police.
WHITBY J: Yes. I will hear from the appellant first.
KELLY, MS: Thank you. I’m requesting a support – somebody as support. Just feeling quite a little bit nervous today.
WHITBY J: All right. First of all, how would you like to be addressed?
KELLY, MS: Dawn, thank you.
WHITBY J: All right. You can have someone sit behind you, just with the solicitors.
KELLY, MS: Thank you. Neil doesn’t have to be – he’s outside. Can someone grab him, please. So, obviously, clearly not supportive at the moment.
WHITBY J: No.
KELLY, MS: Can somebody sit until he gets here?
WHITBY J: All right. Thank you, Dawn. You can have a seat. Yes.
MAYNE, MR: Mayne, I appear for the respondent.
WHITBY J: Thank you, Mr Mayne. I will just wait till you have somebody there, if you like.
KELLY, MS: Could I ask you – – –
WHITBY J: Yes.
KELLY, MS: You mentioned that it’s the WA Police.
WHITBY J: Yes.
KELLY, MS: But it’s – I’m confused with the – who’s here. For example, it was listed as Kelly versus Banner.
WHITBY J: Yes.
KELLY, MS: And so is it Kelly versus Banner or is it the WA Police?
WHITBY J: It’s the WA Police. P.3.
jurisdiction is reflected by the successive letters patents for Governor’s Office of Western Australia. This jurisdiction, in this court, so composed, exercise the King’s justice accordingly. I will repeat that, is this court so composed to exercise the King’s justice accordingly?
WHITBY J: I’m not here to answer your questions, Dawn. I will ask you to continue.
KELLY, MS: So you’re in agreement. With regard to Magistrate’s Court, by operations of the Magistrates Court Act of 2004, from which my matter arose, it is my understanding that the court practices a pretended jurisdiction under the pretended Crown, illegal and criminal in nature. In oppression and denial of my political rights to availability of His Majesty’s justice and mercy for Western Australia within the Commonwealth, a jurisdiction established in 1900 which, by right, is current law.
The intention of assortment of Acts of the Australian Parliament, in 1973, in denying the power of the Commonwealth and Crown by pretence of jurisdiction of another, the Australian Crown was intended to commit a criminal act against the people of Australia, in so much as exercising this pretended jurisdiction is a crime, Criminal Code 1913, section 44, whereby the acts of contempt amounts to sedition. It is not provided that the authority to apply justice in Western Australia begins with the Constitution 1900 UK, which provides the authority of the Crown, pursuant to the preamble covering clauses 2 and 5 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900.
Is it not the authority of letters patent for Western Australia, issued by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, Queen of the United Kingdom, at section 2, subsection (2) and (3), the Constitution Act 1889 requires the same Crown for the king and queen, in parliament and the governor’s office to provide royal assent to bills of the parliament. On 14 May 2024, Stephen Heath, doing business as Chief Magistrate of Western Australia, he stated:
If the prosecution do not establish the necessary authorities to prosecute, then you will be found not guilty.
Under the pretended authorities, post-1973, there is no authority, and Dawn Michelle Kelly must be acquitted, and all convictions and sentences past, current and unfolding P.4.
be withdrawn. All financial impositions repugnant to the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution, section 95 and section 92 must be refunded, restored and duly compensated, as per our legal notices as tendered by evidence.
Memorials and excessive ongoing fines, court costs amounting to malicious prosecutions causing harm, creating trauma, anxiety, financial distress, loss of my home, my ability to work and support myself have been caused unlawfully, officers acting outside of the authority of their office, and I quote the Bill of Rights Act 1688. So, Officer Banner and Stuart Neeter did not have the necessary authority as public officers, and as police officers, pursuant to sections 8, 9 and 10 of the Road Traffic Administration Act, section 10 of the Police Act, the Oath of Office, and section 23 of the Public Sector Management Act. Therefore Dawn Michelle Kelly must be found not guilty and acquitted of all charges.
Officer Banner and Officer Neeter, as public officers, defined under the Criminal Code, do not have the necessary authority to administer and enforce statutory compliance breaches under the Road Traffic Administration Act, an Act to provide for the administration and enforcement of the Road Traffic Act 1974, the Road Traffic Authorisation to Drive Act 2008, the Road Traffic Vehicles Act 2012, and four other matters relating to road traffic.
For want of Queen in parliament, section 2 subsection (2), and want of royal assent, section 3 of the Constitution Act 1889. Dawn Michelle Kelly was charged with offences under the pretended Acts, the Road Traffic Administration Act 2008, the Road Traffic Vehicles Act and the Road Traffic Act of 1974. Take judicial notice of these four mentioned undenied points of law. Is there any reason not to deny these points? I ask you, is there any reason not to deny these points, your Honour.
WHITBY J: Please continue, Dawn.
KELLY, MS: And, for the third time, is there any reason not to disregard these points of law that affirms the authority of the Crown of the United Kingdom? The principle of legal application was acknowledged, and proven at trial, that Stuart Neeter and Trent Banner did not comply with statutory regulations as they did not have a delegation of authority in writing, and signed by the Department of Transport CEO or the Police Department CEO, Col Blanch, pursuant to section 8 subsection (1), subsection (2) and (3) of the Road Traffic Administration P.5.
Act. Forrest & Forrest Pty Ltd v Wilson HCA 30, section 62 states:
A statutory requirement that an administrative agency perform its functions in a manner consistent with the Australian’s obligations under any convention. Public inconvenience would be a result of the invalidity of the Act, especially if those affected by non-compliance were neither responsible for, nor aware of the non-compliance.
Now, page 15 and 16 of the transcript states I subpoenaed documents from – this is for the trial – I subpoenaed documents under form 11, Trent Banner and the West Australian Police versus Dawn Michelle Kelly, and I requested information (1) the delegation of function certificate, issued by the CEO, pursuant to the Road Traffic Administration Act, section 8, delegation of CEOs function of Trent Banner, PD 16524, and Stuart Neeter, PD 136836, terms and conditions of agreement, pursuant to the Road Traffic Admin Act, section 11.
Now, I got a response back from legal service, the registrar, summons (indistinct) Legal Services, Jacob Orley. I refer to the attached witness summons to produce a record or a thing. The summons issued by Perth Magistrates Court, the Commissioner of Western Australian Police, the Commissioner, on 6 February 2024, in relation to the above aforementioned matter. The summons is returnable in the Perth Magistrates Court on 26 February 2024.
Upon the advice of the investigating officers, our office has confirmed that no documents are in existence in relation to items (1), (2), (3), no delegation or function in writing and signed by the CEO of the police Commissioner exists. Therefore, the question I have, what authority do you have to pull me over without a commissioner of a crime? There was no danger, I wasn’t harming anyone, I wasn’t needing your assistance, and you’re purporting to enforce the policies of a Department of Transport without a delegation of function in writing and signed.
The CEO of the Department of Transport directly delegates authority to a public officer, pursuant to the Acts they are administrating. Authority cannot be forward-delegated to anyone, including the CEO of police, section 9 subsection (3) of the Road Traffic Administration Act 2008, that states: P.6.
A person whom a power or duty is delegated under this section cannot delegate that power or duty.
Unless Col Blanch’s name is on the prosecution notice, then the prosecution notice is in statutory non-compliance. Col Blanch, the CEO, cannot forward-delegate, pursuant to the Road Traffic Act 2008. Within the law of this pretended jurisdiction, even if a delegation of authority in writing, and signed by the CEO of police, which they do not have, it cannot be forward-delegated to an officer relating to statutory breaches in the Road Traffic Administration Act of 2008. It can only be delegated by the CEO of the Department of Transport.
Col Blanch’s name was not on the prosecution notice as at prosecution. An FOI request was made, on 16 September 2024, to the West Australian Police Force Office of Information Management requesting information held by the WA Police, relating to a delegation of authority in writing, and signed by the CEO of the Department of Transport, pursuant to the Road Traffic Administration Act relating to Col Blanch – just one moment. Furthermore, all Acts post 1986 are references to policies not mine. An FOI request was made, investigating information held by the police, point (8):
In regard to your request regarding delegation of authority, the delegation of functions, signed by the CEO of the Department of Transport, I have been advised by the Commissioner’s office that they do not hold these documents.
Neither the Department of Transport, nor the West Australian Police hold a delegation of authority, in writing and signed, pursuant to the pretended Road Traffic Administration Act of 2008, an absolute, not negotiable statutory requirement.
It is, what is good for the goose is good for the gander. No one is above the law. An erroneous interpretation of the Acts by Elizabeth Woods, doing business as deputy chief magistrate, stated that the officers did not need a delegation of authority under the pretended Road Traffic Administration Act because they were police officers. As police officers, pursuant to section 10 of the Police Act of 1892, their statutory requirement is their oath of office. Section 10 is clear:
No person shall be capable of holding any office, or appointment in the police force, or acting in any way P.7.
therein, until he shall have subscribed to the following engagement, namely, I, A.B., engage and promise that I will well and truly serve our Sovereign Lady, the Queen –
of the United Kingdom –
in the office of police Commissioner, inspector, sub-inspector and other officers or constables as the case may be, without favour or affection, malice or ill will, until I’m legally discharged; that I will see and cause Her Majesty’s peace to be kept and preserved, and that I will prevent, to the best of my power, all offences against the same; and that, while I shall continue to hold the said office, I will, to the best of my skill and knowledge, discharge all of the duties thereof faithfully according to law. And the said engagement shall be subscribed in the presence and attested –
I’ll repeat that:
…attested by a Justice or commissioned police officer of the force.
So they have to prove that they have this commission. Section 5, Interpretation Act 1984, subsection (5) terms used in written law in this Act and every other written law. Her Majesty, His Majesty, King, Queen or Crown means Sovereign of the United Kingdom, which is the emblem above your head, your Honour, which is the original jurisdiction.
Section 10 of the Police Act 1892, oath of office to our Sovereign Lady, the Queen, attested by a Justice or commissioned officer, being the Queen of the United Kingdom, Royal Style and Titles Act of 1953, schedule, Elizabeth II, by the grace of God of the United Kingdom, Australia and her realms and territories, Queen, Head of the Commonwealth and Defender of the Faith.
Now, in 1973 the schedule was changed. Elizabeth II, by the grace of God of the Queen of Australia and her other realms and territories, Head of the Commonwealth, removed the United Kingdom and the grace of God with a stroke of a legislative pen, removing the United Kingdom and created a statutory office without a head of power, the Queen of Australia. Governors sworn to the Queen of Australia, without a head of power, any Act assented by a governor, under purported authority of the Queen of Australia, is null and void. P.8.
The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, clause 2, an Act to amend the Queen’s successors. The provisions of this Act referring to the Queen shall extend to Her Majesty’s heirs, successors in the sovereignty of the United Kingdom. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act clause 5, operation of the constitution of laws:
This Act and all laws made by the parliament of the Commonwealth under the constitution shall be binding on the courts, the judges and the people of every State and every part of the Commonwealth, notwithstanding anything in the laws of the State. And the laws of the Commonwealth shall be enforced on all British ships –
etcetera. Royal assent is what grants authority to an Act. Kerry Sanderson assumed the office of Governor on 24 September 2014, swore an oath to the Queen of Australia, a statutory office with no head of power. Elizabeth II, by the grace of God, Queen of Australia and her realms and territories, head of the Commonwealth. In 2015 Kerry Sanderson, doing business as Governor of West Australia, gave pretended assent to the Road Traffic Administration Act of 2008, seven years after the Act was created.
Now, section 1, citation, the proclamation of the Road Traffic Administration Act, commencement proclamation 2015. Number (2) the commencement, other than (1) and (2), the Road Traffic Administration Act, other than sections (1) or (2), comes into operation on 27 April 2015. Now, this is interesting, by the wording of the proclamation of the Road Traffic Administration Act, including the Road Traffic Authorisation to Drive Act, the Road Traffic Vehicles Act, the Road Vehicles Taxing Act, the Road Traffic Amendment, Alcohol and Drug Related Offences 2011, and a long list of other Acts included under the umbrella of this Act.
So, other than (1) or (3) meaning of the Road Traffic Administration Act and all umbrella Acts are not in operation. Accused of being a pseudo-law enthusiast by the Supreme Court and Magistrates Court, it would appear, evidenced by the statute, that the court officers and public officers employed by the West Australian Government are in fact the pseudo-law enthusiasts, gaslighting those who shine the light on statutory fraud. We have not seen any case law establishing pseudo-law. It’s an opinion only which has harmed me and my reputation.
Every West Australian police officer, who has sworn an oath post-1973, cannot be a duly sworn police officer under P.9.
the Police Act of 1892, section 10. Any Governor, post the Interpretation Act states that the definition of a Queen is the sovereign of the United Kingdom and not the Queen of Australia. Every West Australian police officer – all police officers must take a duly sworn oath in accordance to section 10 of the Police Act in the presence, and attested by justice or commissioned officer of the police – of the force.
The person administering the oath has to be under the same Crown as the oath that is required. No police officer is a duly sworn officer under a pretended authority. It is the statutory requirement that they must provide proof of this oath. Without this, not a police officer is – they’re not a police officer defined under the Police Act and the Act says so. Without evidence of a duly sworn oath to a Sovereign Lady administered by the Crown, Trent Banner and Stuart Neeter are, at very best, employees of a corporate government department known as the West Australian Police with an ABN.
They are public officers enforcing corporate statutes, and must have a delegation of authority and function in writing by the CEO and signed. Section 23 of the Public Sector Management Act states:
The Commissioner may delegate to a person any power or duty of the Commissioner under the provision of this Act or any other Act.
Number (2):
A delegation under this section must be in writing and signed by the Commissioner.
Section (3):
A person to whom a power or duty is delegated under this section cannot delegate that power or duty.
Section (4):
A person exercising or performing a power or duty that has been in accordance with the terms of the delegation unless the contrary is shown.
And number (5): P.10.
Nothing in this section limits the ability of the Commissioner to perform a function through an officer or agent.
Men and women – excuse me. Furthermore, the Commissioner or the Public Sector Management Act has no power because they have not been duly sworn. Men and women employed within the public sector umbrella, the West Australian Police, with an ABN, must comply with every pretended corporate statute with the very – sorry, with the very pretended corporate statutes that they claim to have the authority to enforce.
Col Blanch, the Commissioner, is the CEO. Section 4 subsection (1) subsection (3) of the corporatised police force, under the Public Sector Management of 1994. Col Blanch occupies the office of Commissioner and is the person holding the office of Public Sector Commissioner established by section 16 subsection (6) of the office of Public Sector Commissioner established by 16 subsection (1) of the Public Sector Management Act.
We’ve not been provided with evidence that Col Blanch has a delegation of authority in writing and signed by the Commissioner, Sharyn O’Neill, an absolute necessary fulfilment of a pretended statutory function establishing authority as a public officer. Col Blanch employs public officers in the same way that other public sector CEOs do, pursuant to the Public Sector Management Act in section 23 of that Act.
The public officers, Stuart Neeter and Trent Banner are no different than any public officer without a delegation of function in writing, and signed by the CEO of police, pursuant to the Public Sector Management Act section 23, subsections (1) and (2). Acting in the capacity of a public officer, they require delegation of authority, pursuant to the Public Sector Management Act, section 33, delegation by CEO or chief employees, Corporations Act 2001, section 189D, delegation, Corporations Act 2001, section 253, electronic record keeping of minute books, electronic record and keeping of minute books. Sorry I repeated that by accident.
Officers who allege they are police officers, pursuant to the Police Act of 1892, as stated by Elizabeth Woods, doing business as magistrate, have unfettered – they have unfettered powers to do whatever they want with no accountability. The police of Western Australia should – sorry, the people of Western Australia should be very P.11
concerned. Terrorism, Extraordinary Powers Act 2005, Terrorism Preventative Detention Act 2006, Mandatory Testing of Infectious Diseases Act 2014, using corporate police security force to enforce government overreach during Covid.
And now the current misinformation bill being tabled in the federal Senate, legislation passed under a pretended jurisdiction, an extreme overreach of government that is harming the people of Western Australia, including myself. I have been harmed by non-compliance of legislation by politicians, police and judiciary acting outside of the authority of their office. The alleged crime in this matter was an administrative issue between Dawn Michelle Kelly and the Department of Transport, treated like a criminal, and slanderously labelled as a recidivist, as a result of asserting my rights in a commercial capacity.
No evidence has been provided by the Department of Transport proving there’s a driver’s licence contract in a Freedom of Information request made. On 16 September, an FOI letter was sent from Shalin Ferguson in response to an FOI request regarding the delegation of function signed and in writing by the CEO of Department of Transport, pursuant to section 8 of the Road Traffic Administration Act, for the following officers, Col Blanch PD 16640, Owen Feander PD 12894, Geoffrey Osborne PD 13302, Tegan Jenner-Nelson PD 15747, Susan Henderson PD 13444, Carl Webb PD 13759, Trent Banner PD 16524, Paul Inkster 16738, Stuart McRae PD 10770, Anthony Nuttall PD 13302 and Stephen Young PD 11557:
In regard to your request for the delegation of function –
signed and in writing by the CEO, the Department of Transport –
I’ve been advised by the Commissioner’s office that they do not hold the documents you may wish to seek for the information regarding the Department of Transport.
So, they’re asking me to apply to the Department of Transport, which I have and it doesn’t exist. An FOI confirmed that the Department of Transport has no record of delegation of authority, pursuant to the Road Traffic Act 2008, section 8, section 9, section 10. The same FOI stated that there was no centralised records of oath of office taken by the aforementioned officers. You
Now, I bring you back to section 198D, delegation, and p12.
section 253 electronic recording and keeping of minute books recording information. So, Trent Banner and Stuart Neeter, State security officers, members of an anti-terrorist squad, armed with an AR15 semi-automatic rifle, enforced alleged traffic breaches without the authority to do so, resulting in threats of violence, trespass, extortion, theft and deprivation of my liberty. This should be of grave concern to every Western Australian.
Trent Banner and Stuart Neater claim they had the authority to impose a duty, in a non-commercial activity, my constitutional right under section 92 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution, trade in the Commonwealth shall be free. Intercourse among States shall be absolutely free. Intercourse, defined as communication or dealings between individuals or groups, not sexual intercourse per se, just clearing that up.
However, the imposition of an unlawful duty, fine, registration and licence imposition, repugnant to section 92 of the constitution, pardon the pun, but – pardon the pun and the language, but we, the people, are getting f’d by the government, so that’s the intercourse that I’m seeing as evidenced in my own self. Claiming a pretended authority to administer and enforce a pretended law, the Road Traffic Administration Act as public officers, an offer was made to verify their claim, as evidenced in affidavit sent and lodged as evidence in this matter.
They acted in dishonour and proceeded to prosecution belligerently, causing harm, loss and pain by way of their unlawful trespass. Employees of a security firm, carrying military grade weapons – weaponry, wearing bulletproof police branded costumes, driving police cars with vibrant police branding, marketing fear with sirens and lighting, armed and dangerous, impersonating du jour police officers under section 10 of the Police Act, designed to instil fear, purporting to be public officers without a delegation of authority, engaging in criminal activity – section 87 of the Criminal Code -without a delegation of authority in writing and signed by the CEO.
They’re impersonating public officers. Men and women of Western Australia, who are forced to do business as persons, are classified as customers in the West Australian Police annual report of 2023. $9,050,338.16 was spent on advertising, market research, polling and direct mail public sector commission annual report guidelines. This is funded by their customers, marketing to justify their services and unlawful revenue raising. P13.
The role of a police officer is to keep and preserve His or Her Majesty’s peace, without favour or affection, malice or ill will, according to the Police Act section 10. Now, the conflict of interest arises when police and magistrate, working together, interpret statutes to support a financial advantage for the State by way of a fine, penalty, repugnant to section 92 and section 92 – sorry, section 92 and 95 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution 1900 UK.
What law are we talking about? Pseudo-law? Pretended law? Asserting a jurisdiction that the Magistrates Court does not have. Acts, Amendment and Repeal Court Legal Practice Act, removing the Sovereign, the Crown, more than 62 times in all courts in Western Australia, bar the Magistrates Court because it didn’t exist in the beginning. A court of pretended jurisdiction, gaslighting people, such as myself, who question jurisdiction and authority of the statutes.
This is every West Australian’s right in a fiduciary capacity. Have we become a republic by stealth and subterfuge? The fabian labour government is doing their best to overthrow the monarchy, which is a crime of sedition and treason. Magistrates – now, let me talk about crime and treason. Okay. Criminal Code Compilation Acts 1913, Part 2, section 44, Seditious Intention:
An intention to effect any of the following purposes, that is to say, to bring the Sovereign into hatred or contempt, to excite disaffection against the Sovereign, or the government, or constitution of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth of Australia or West Australia, as established – as law established, or against either house of parliament of the United Kingdom, and the Commonwealth of Australia or Western Australia against the administration of justice.
(c):
To excite Her Majesty’s subjects to attempt to procure the alteration of any matter of State law established otherwise.
Now, I stand under the correct coat of arms. Section 44, Acts to be excepted from section 44:
It is lawful for any person to endeavour, in good faith, to show that the sovereign has been mistaken in p.14
any of her counsels, to point out, in good faith, a government or constitution of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth of Australia, or West Australia by law established, or in legislation, or administration of justice with a view of the reformation of such areas or defects –
which is what we’re doing today, correct the record:
To excite, in good faith, Her Majesty’s subjects, to attempt to procure, by lawful means, the alteration of any matter in this State such as established by law. To point out, in good faith, in order to their removal of any matters producing – to have a tendency to produce feelings of ill will and enmity between different classes of Her Majesty’s subjects.
And this is what I’m doing today, in good faith and honour. Furthermore, we have an offer of evidence. We have the complete filing that has been lodged in the Privy Council of – the High Court, sorry, my mistake, High Court of justice – against the Chief Justice. Magistrates and Justices are also public officers, employed by a corporatised Department of Justice, ABN 70598519443. Criminal Code, section 1B also require a delegation of authority by a CEO, Director-General of Department of Justice, pursuant to section 23 of the Public Sector Management Act.
Without lawful statutory authority, what gives Stuart Neeter and Trent Banner the authority to steal private property, commit crimes of extortion, pursuant to section 396, 397 of the Criminal Code. 396 is demanding property with threats of intent to steal, which they actually did, demanding property with threats, intent to extort or gain, which they did and that was proven in court. To impose a duty by force and coercion through prosecution, reason being statutory breach, breach of clauses of a contract contrary to section 92 of the Constitution.
Without lawful statutory authority, Stuart Neeter and Trent Banner are privately liable for their actions. Stuart Neeter admitted to stealing my property, being a car registered on the PPSR to Dawn Michelle Kelly. Stuart Neeter stole my car. Section 371A Criminal Code Compilation Act, using a motor car without consent is stealing. Stuart Neeter and Trent Banner demanded property with threats to intent – to steal, section 398 of the Criminal Code Compilation Act. p15.
Stuart Neeter and Trent Banner demanded property with threats to – intent to extort gain, in collaboration with Adrian Di Lallo of AAAC Towing, would not give me my car back until I paid their extortion and racketeering fees. I am the secured party creditor of this property. In 2022 the West Australian Police, in a similar situation, stole my car in an attempt to extort money from our estate. I refused to pay the AAAC Towing.
Police impounding unit sent a demand notice stating that unless I remove my car from the PPSR, they would crush it. They crushed it. Wilful damage of property, section 444 of the Criminal Code, criminal damage, damaging property. Here we go. The charges are immaterial in this matter. The prosecution notice is illegal. Magistrate Young, Woods – and Woods, including Musikanth J in Kelly v Fiander 275, in tandem, did not address the issues of the illegal, defective and fraudulent prosecution notice, lawful argument, that being the name on the prosecution notice is written in a foreign language, being American sign, pursuant to the Chicago styles 16th edition.
The prosecution notice is defective, written in a foreign language, being glosses in ASL, 11.147 glosses in ASL. The written language transcription of a sign is called gloss. Glosses are words from the spoken language written in small capital letters, woman, school, cat, etcetera. Alternatively, regular capital letters may be used. When two or more written words are used in gloss in a single sign, the glosses are separated by hyphens. The translation for sign, a drive by – vehicle drive by.
So, section 11, foreign language table. So, it’s- essentially, this is saying that the name on the prosecution notice was written in a foreign language, repugnant to the King’s English, which is, by all styles manuals, should be followed. Section 5 of the Criminal Appeal Regulation Act is defective and ambiguous. Section 5 in the Criminal Appeal Regulation states, in your pretended acts, when completing a form in schedule 1, the name of a party must be capitalised according to the preferences of the party. The family name of the party must be underlined.
Now, the examples they give contradicts what they’re actually stating, which is ambiguous in itself. So, just saying that under the coat of arms, we’re not referring to that. Criminal Procedure Regulations 2005, schedule 1, form 3, the description must comply with the CPA Schedule. The officer’s form must be filled out in a foreign P.16
language. This description must comply with the CPA schedule 1 and 4. Identity of the prosecutor, in accordance with the CPA schedule 1 and clause 3.
Magistrate Woods, under the Criminal Procedures Act, granted royal assent by the representatives of the Queen of Australia, not the Sovereign of the United Kingdom, as so defined in the Interpretations Act, had the authority to enter a plea on behalf of Dawn Michelle Kelly Estate Trust, administering her trust without consent, a breach of trust law, trespassing on the legal name, in deception and fraud, section 88 of the Criminal Code, also in breach of Crown copyright laws.
The West Australian Police cannot rely on a certificate if they are an interested party. Day v Savadge, S-a-v-a-d-g-e, 1614 HOB 85; 80 ER 235, unconscionable conduct, deceptive business practices. We sent Trent Banner and Stuart Neeter correspondence, a recognised administrative process of three notices, in the same way that the police used the fines enforcement three notice process, and it was ignored by both Magistrate Woods in trial, and Stuart Neeter and Trent Banner.
Do Stuart Neeter and Trent Banner, as police officers, public officers, agent of the Department of Transport, have the authority to impose a duty on Dawn Michelle Kelly, a subject of the Imperial Crown, the imposition of a fine by way of prosecution in commerce without a contractual agreement, repugnant to section 92 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, trade within the Commonwealth to be free, absolutely free.
Intercourse between Stuart Neeter, Trent Banner and Dawn Michelle Kelly, intercourse meaning a conversation and exchange of ideas, being the first step of negotiation. An imposition by force into commerce, prosecution penalty without a valid lawful contract between the two parties. Section 95 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, customs and duties of Western Australia, notwithstanding anything in this constitution, the parliament of the State of Western Australia, if that state be an original State, may, during the first five years after the imposition of uniform duties of the Commonwealth, impose duties of customs on goods passing into the State and not originally imported. Any duty so imposed on any goods shall not exceed, during the first of such years, of the duty between Western Australia.
Fraudulent concealment, which capacity does this court P.17.
proceed with us today, status living or status legal. What is the jurisdiction, civil or criminal, clearly it doesn’t matter, or (indistinct) quasi-criminal performance of a contract, a statutory right in (indistinct) the statutory power of equitable decree in a maritime case. Section 10 of the respondent’s submissions makes a reference to section 78, subsection (3) of the Criminal Procedures Act. If a written law creates a simple offence, breach of a statute, cause of a contract, and provides an exception in respect to the offence, the exception is to be taken not to apply unless the accused proves, on the balance of probabilities, that it does. The balance of probabilities. Civil claim versus beyond reasonable doubt, criminal charge.
Why is this matter deceptively classified as criminal yet listed as civil, CIV, SC/CIV/PER/SJA/1029/2024. Penhallow v Doane Administrators. In as much as every government is an artificial person, an abstraction, a creature of the mind only, a government can only interface with other artificial persons. The imaginary, having neither actuality or substance, is foreclosed from creating and attaining parity with the tangible.
The corporatisation of the living individual by way of the legal person, legal name, registration, succinctly defines the two separate statutes of an individual. First, the natural and, second, the legal person, illustrated in Penhallow v Doane Administrators, supported in framing within the Australian statutes, recognising the two. Privacy Act 1998 Commonwealth section 6, subsection (2), Corporations Act 2001 Commonwealth Part 1.5.52A, signing, subsection (1.8) directors section, signing and company documents, both possessing different legal requirements in fulfilment upon statutory identity recognition.
All government agencies have no parity with the living and if interface can only be by corporatisation, or un-incorporatisation of an individual’s status identity upon registration, and only then can their fictional entity be applied to their status identity plural. This legal person’s separate capacity status is, in effect, an incorporated company, in and of itself, being the individual’s set identity status, fictional entity, applied in order for a government and its courts, being a constructed organisation government, in order to interface with a living individual.
Only like entities can interface with one another, corporate to corporate, company to company, having no P.18
parity with one another, not corporate to living individual or incorporated company to living individuals, without a live and explicit executionable instrument of consent in commercial contracting, negotiated offer to contract. Final. Everything in commercial world is a negotiable step in contracting phase. Negotiation cannot be forced or imposed upon a natural living individual by implied consent.
The courts order in commerce, acting on behalf of the natural living individual, outside of a contract sealed in signature, ordering compliance of a corporate governance, absence of a legal – status legal, in exclusion and possession of the natural living individual. They’re an executable authoritative instrument to contract with the court. They’re signature for contract acceptance, sealed upon signing, and only given willingly.
The status legal of the natural living individual, or representative on the natural living individual by consent, that being that one of the same, and acting simultaneously in two different capacities becomes a trespass by the court upon the living individual’s abrogated right to abstain to contract explicitly, and cannot be put by the court an imposition, applying an implied tacit obligation to fulfil an order on demand upon the natural individual, the court now sitting outside of commercial practice.
An agency of government implied contracting is unconscionable in a court of equity by a commercial agency. The natural living individual possesses exclusive right of choice how and when they interact, or interface with others in life, be they natural living individuals or incorporated companies and agency. It is a matter of willingness. In other words, no live contracts signed to corporate government. No compliance obligation in default of performance of a non-existent contract for corporate governance.
A matter of choice to interface without threat, malice or harm imposed upon us. Common law contracts. In this way, no – this is – no way diminishes the effect of common law contracts made out on a handshake by a verbal agreement, understanding or undertaking, including tacit procurement contracts implied or indicated by an act or by silence. It is not actually expressed or carried out on words or speech made in such conduct by acceptance, be it stated or not.
Following the precepts of common law is in no way to P.19
be dismissed. As the appellant asserts, I am the executor of contracts for the natural private person. This lack of grasp to understanding a 228 year precedent, set in the law schools of Oxford and Cambridge, ongoing to the King’s Bench to find themselves proceeding in admiralty REM jurisdiction under the legislature of New Hampshire founded
in charter colonies.
Status living versus status legal. Legal name Dawn Michelle Kelly. Legal/corporate status, Dawn Michelle, living status, Kelly incorporated to do business with the corporate government by deception. Dawn Michelle, proper English, is the CEO of the Dawn Michelle Kelly corporate identity status, having many obligations that must be fulfilled by the office of CEO, chief executive officer. The legal person doing business name is treated as an organisation in different capacities.
The legal name is a doing business organisation that requires a signature to deal with contracts or execute documents. A signature is a lawful requirement to deal with contracts or execute documents. The prosecution notice must have a signature of two parties to validate a lawful contractual obligation in order to prosecute in a corporate capacity. A plea entered by a court without an executable instrument, unconscionable conduct, predatory business practice, the courts may have consent of the accused – must have consent of the accused, by way of plea, in order to proceed in prosecution. Plea, being the contractual agreement, must include the element of meeting of the minds, elements of a contract.
There is no definition of meaning plea in the Criminal Procedures Act section, 2024, Corporate Slavery Legislation, labelling of a criminal in a civil matter, summary offence, no victim identified. Magistrate and Justice erred in law, erred in judgment, erred in fact. The court established a contract with the appellant without authority. Commercial law applies in the authority to do something. No one else can act on the behalf of Dawn Michelle Kelly without a court order.
Magistrate Woods did not provide evidence of a court order giving them authority to enter a plea or conviction, prosecution notice, absent of a signature by a CEO, of the legal person, legal name Dawn Michelle Kelly, is the State of Western Australia operating under the Crown, within the Commonwealth, pursuant to the Commonwealth. For a State to exist, it requires the performance of the Commonwealth Constitution, section 106, if you remove the Constitution P.20.
of the Commonwealth you remove 106, and the State ceases to exist, reverting to colonies.
Magistrate Woods, in a pretended jurisdiction, did not act within the jurisdiction of the Crown, within the Commonwealth. Authority assumed by way of the statute cited, deficient of Crown in question in this matter. Magistrates Woods and her co-conspirators, under a pretended authority, harmed us and we seek remedy by way of compensation. The prosecution notice is a contract without authority, no living contract with the accused.
Every contract requires a wet ink signature. An officer of the business organisation executes the authority through the signature by agreement. Copyrighted, Dawn Michelle Kelly has exclusive rights, the absolute power to enter into any agreement or contract, not as an officer of the corporate entity organisation so created. No one can lawfully trespass on a corporate entity. This legal capacity can only be transferred by way of power of attorney signed and witnessed.
The all acts constitute a contract to be offered and accepted by way of legal instruments, pursuant to the Regulatory Powers (Standard Provisions Act) of 2014. These are the primary conditions for a contract to exist when accepted by both parties, and the elements of a contract offer an acceptance. Number (1) parties competent to contract, number (2) free and genuine consent, (3) full disclosure, (4) valuable consideration, (5) certainty of terms, (6) meeting of the mind, (7) signature or autograph, and number (8) privity of contract.
Now, the second part of my oral submission, I will be addressing the respondent’s submissions. So A2, so it says the prosecution case at trial. We’ve got, section (b), Sergeant Neeter used the one force core application on his phone to check the vehicle’s licence plate registration, but there was no match. As a result, the officers suspected that the driver might be committing an offence under a false registration plate.
Our response. On 18 January 2024, a notice to rescind and withdraw consent, implied or real, of non-existent contract between Dawn Michelle Kelly and the Department of Transport, Dawn Michelle for the Dawn Michelle Kelly Estate Trust, on disclosed information relating to the driver’s licence 3539489 was sent to the CEO of the Department of Transport. Tracking number TMP1969000403008663731094, cc’d into the correspondence was the Police Minister, the CEO of P.21.
Police, so Rita Saffioti as well.
An FOI search was completed and no driver’s license, and DOT notice regarding licence and contract for Dawn Michelle Kelly. So of the response, section (b) extension of time within which to appeal. An appeal cannot be commenced after 28 days after the decision unless the Supreme Court orders otherwise. This matter is in the interests of justice and public interest. Stuart Neeter and Trent Banner do not have the required authority to administer and enforce any law in Western Australia, as they claim to do so, without a correct oath of office, and the necessary delegation of authority as a public officer, signed and in writing by the CEO.
Now, in his point (8), in considering whether it’s in the interest of justice to grant an extension of time, factors which may generally be considered are of the nature and extent of the delay. The grant of time must be allowed. Unconscionable conduct, taking advantage of a self-litigant who has the right to defend any claim made against them by another, Blomley v Ryan [1954] 99 CLR 362. Given the short time for which the extension is required, the respondent does not oppose, so he doesn’t oppose the extension of time. Now for reasons – so number (12) of your response:
For reasons which follow, leave to appeal should be refused on the grounds the appeal should be dismissed with costs.
Now, we say otherwise. Case law, Joose & Anor v The Australian Securities Investment Commission M35/1998 [1998] HCA trans 492, on 15 December 1998 states:
I make no order for costs as each arises out of a criminal or quasi-criminal matter. I certify for counsel.
Also, section (c) of the response, subsection (1) error in amending charges. The Road Traffic Admin Act and the Road Traffic Code 2000, absent of royal assent from the Sovereign of the Queen of the United Kingdom, a pretended pseudo law. Kerry Sanderson, government of West Australia, assumed the office of Governor of Western Australia, an oath taken to the Queen of Australia, gave pretended assent to these acts, which have not, under section 2 of the Road Traffic Administration Act, has been commenced.
This Act never received royal assent by definition of P.22.
the Interpretation Act of section 5. Furthermore, section – of the response submissions (c) grounds (1) and (2) error in amending charges, states magistrate erred in judgement. It was established that both Stuart Neeter and Officer Banner did not comply with statutory requirement of a delegation of authority, pursuant to (8) and (9) of the Road Traffic Administration Act.
Also, an FOI notice of decision, under section 30 of the Freedom of Information Act of 1992, dated 16 September, Shannon Ferguson, freedom of information officer, public access:
I have been advised by the Commissioner’s office that they do not hold these documents, and you may wish to seek this information from the Department of Transport directly.
Which we did, and we determined that it doesn’t exist:
Officers who do not have delegation of authority, pursuant to the Act, do not have authority as a public officer to administer this Act.
Forrest & Forrest Pty Ltd v Wilson [2017] HCA 13:
If a statute, sequential non-compliance of performance of function invalidates the statute, prescribes a mode of exercising that statutory power must be followed, and, if it is not followed, action taken in breach of it requires will be adjudged as beyond its power.
Section 118 of that case law:
Such attacks must be made, if at all, before grant.
We attempted to settle out of court, asking various compliance questions, to which the officers did not answer. Now, the response submission, section 14, the charges are immaterial if the officers have not complied with the statutory requirements. He – in response submission, section 16 of his response – of the State Solicitor’s response, we say, section 132 states:
The powers in this section may be exercised by a court in relation to a charge at any time before trial.
This amendment was made after trial and does not apply. Response, section 18, it says: P.23.
It is further submitted that the appellant was given an opportunity to ask questions before the magistrate, before the decision to amend was made, and the appellant did not formally object.
Well, the magistrate delivered her decision a month after trial, a formal objection to a premeditated decision. The appellant, being a self-litigant, was not aware that this was an option, if this was actually the case. Section 23 of the State Solicitor’s response:
The trial was conducted on the common basis that the allegation was a failure by the appellant to stop the vehicle when directed to do so by Sergeant Neeter.
If the prosecution don’t establish any of the necessary authorities, then you will be found not guilty, which is at transcript page 3, lines 24 to 27, MC/CRI/PE/CRIM/8080/2024. Furthermore, section 27 of the State Solicitor’s response:
The respondent submits that the magistrate was correct in finding that section 23 of the Road Traffic Administration Act directly conferred a power on Sergeant Neeter, a police officer, to direct the appellant to stop a vehicle for the purpose of investigating an offence under a road law. No delegation was required.
Non-compliance of a statutory requirement by a public officer voids the statute, Forrest & Forrest v Wilson HCA 30. In a corporate capacity, compliance applies to the officers enforcing the Road Traffic Administration Act. As public officers, they are granted authority through a CEO in a corporate capacity. The public at large cannot assume these officers have authority to trespass without verified proof of authority. A quo warranto was sent to Stuart Neeter and Trent Banner, and they were asked to provide their proof of claim of authority, acting dishonourably, proceeding to prosecution without verifying their authority as a sworn officer, under section 10 of the Police Act.
The appellant should be acquitted as the magistrate erred in opinion, erred in law and erred in fact, making up her own laws as she sees fit. Section – grounds error in entering not guilty pleas. Section 20 of the State Solicitor’s response. The Magistrates Court failed to identify which status we were being dealt with, status living, the living man or woman in the common law, or status legal, the legal name, legal persons, ens legis, P.24.
Penhallow v Doane Administrators. Quoting that again:
In as much as every government is an artificial person, an abstraction and a creature of the mind only, a government can only interface with other artificial persons.
The imaginary, having neither actuality nor substance, is foreclosed from creating and attaining parity with the tangible. The corporatisation of a living individual by way of the legal person, legal name registration, succinctly two different statuses of individual, the first being the natural and the second is the legal person, illustrated in Penhallow v Doane, supported in the framing of the Australian statutes as mentioned earlier. So, section 29 of the State Solicitor’s response.
The misguided opinion of the magistrate, justices and the State Solicitor, the three notice process and estoppel, lodged with the Supreme Court by way of service of affidavit, relate to the alternative disputes resolution process. Administrative law to seek resolution outside of the court process. Trent Banner, and Stuart Neeter and Adrian Di Lallo were sent correspondence, a noticing process, not unlike used by the department – Police Department and the Fines Enforcement Registry. Ignoring – and on their – just show you, on their notices:
Ignoring this notice will not make it go away.
So, again, misguided opinions – sorry, section 30 of the State Solicitor’s submissions or response, the respondent submits to the ground, they have no basis in law and cannot succeed. I think otherwise. Again, the misguided opinions of the magistrates, justices and State Solicitors referring to pseudo law, a fictional term that does not exist at law, mere conjecture, subjective proposition created in the minds of individuals used to sidestep valid points of law raised by the appellant in Kelly v Fiander 187 and Kelly v Fiander in 275.
Defamation and discrimination used to control a narrative to uphold the control mechanisms of the courts. Unfair, biased interpretations of law, true purpose, to suppress our valid lawful defence, and hide the deception perpetuated in this court. Section 31 of the State Solicitor’s response:
Failure to give full discovery, both timing and full disclosure, was denied the appellant. P.25.
Criminal Procedures Act – the pretended Criminal Procedures Act, section 61, under the Magistrates Court, disclosed by a prosecutor. Full disclosure, so section 5, subsection (e)(vi):
Full disclosure must be served within 28 days prior to trial.
Also, section 32 of the response:
Respondent’s position is that disclosure of a witness statement and evidentiary matter upon trial was served upon the appellant.
Trent Banner failed to provide video footage requested by email. Section 33 of the State Solicitor’s response:
The appellant did not seek to adjourn the trial.
The appellant currently has six cases in the Court of – one in the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court, the Magistrates Court and the Family Court. I’ve now had to do another appeal, which has just consumed my whole life, harming me, full disclosure prejudiced by the defence relating to cross-examination of the officers on the stand. The video not provided was the pursuit video, with the conversations between the officers describing the accused as a sovereign citizen, a term used by police to describe domestic terrorists.
Trent Banner and Stuart Neeter worked for the State Security Group and carry an AR-15 deadly assault rifle or weapon. That’s really scary for me. You’ve got these men and women running around without the authority to do so. Section 35 of the response – sorry, do you mind if I just – I’ve got a sore back.
WHITBY J: You can sit on the chair, if you like.
KELLY, MS: Yes. Can I do that? Thanks. Okay. So, we’ve got section 35. Appeal submission, section 6, magistrate denying the tendering of documents. The misguided opinion of the magistrate, justices and State Solicitor, the three notice process was ignored. Appeal submission, section (8) the magistrate was biased, adjudicator in favour of the prosecution over the accused, managing the trial pursuant to the prosecution’s version of events. P.26.
Magistrate did not allow the defence to explore the legal authority by which the transport laws, pursuant to the charges, breach of statute and the accused is unlawful in regard to the accused being a private individual, of non-commercial capacity, on the King’s road. Appeal point, section 9, the magistrate acted as lawyer for the accused, directing – sorry, not the accused, for the prosecution, directing the – actually, sorry, that’s incorrect.
Appeal point section 9, magistrate acted as lawyer for the accused, directing the defence case from the bench. Abuse of judicial power prosecuting from the bench as well. Section 11, the magistrate was not an unbiased adjudicator, acting as the lawyer for the prosecution’s case as well, stopping the witness from answering questions put to the witness during cross-examination. The magistrate cited Glenn Cash’s paper “A Kind of Magic”, omitting the buzzwords “OPCA litigant”, sovereign citizen and pseudo-law.
The inference drawn implied conjecture to be one of the same. Page 6 of the reserve decision in transcript, given a month prior to – post-trial. Her Honour:
It became apparent that the accused was a person, in a group of people, who attempted to continually, and without success, and without legal training, to avoid the operation of laws which they do not want to comply with. This line of thought has emerged in the US and spread to a number of other locations across the world. Unfortunately, Australia has not been exempt from that, and primarily has been accessed by those who abide by it through the internet. The accused – – –
Excuse me, your Honour, we’re not an OPCA litigant. Her Honour:
The points put largely were incoherent and incomprehensible.
Which I find very, very offensive:
Defence presented was without any merit, and totally misguided and ill-conceived. The accused took sections out of context and sought to apply them to her particular situation. In this jurisdiction –
or I should say, a pretended jurisdiction – P.29.
a human being is a legal person, an adult human being, with a capacity that can sue and be sued, and they are also subject to criminal laws of the State and so is she.
Now, I would like to bring your attention also to the affidavit submitted to this court and the State Solicitor. And I would like to just put here – I would like to say, we, Dawn Michelle, the living, breathing woman of soul, not a human being as defined in the James A. Ballantyne Law Dictionary, 1948 edition, “A monster who cannot be an heir to any land”, who is the CEO of the business entity, legal name, legal person, Dawn Michelle Kelly, a self-litigant, right of audience, occupying the office of the legal person.
We refute all assumptions that the court may have about us. We also refute any false and damaging assertions, subjective propositions made by Supreme Court, Van Dongen, Musikanth JJ, of Western Australia, and also Magistrate Woods, Magistrate Young, Magistrate Shackleton, and other magistrates past, present, and unfolding, who label Dawn Michelle Kelly as a sovereign citizen, an OPC litigant, or a pseudo-law enthusiast.
We do not consent to being corporatised by trespass of the legal name Dawn Michelle Kelly, or Dawn Michelle KELLY, without our written and informed consent and a wet ink signature, Contract Trust Law, section 1.5.7, Corporations Act, Fair Trading Act, Competition and Consumer Act. You have a copy of this, so I will not continue with that. The State Solicitor’s response, section 51, the information provided by an FOI and summons, conclusion, “No delegation of authority”. Now, the State Solicitor’s response, section 52. So, grounds – so he’s saying:
These grounds can be construed as the contention that the magistrate erred in law, and incorrectly finding the accused did not have a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with Sergeant Neeter’s direction, as provided in section 44 of the RTTA. The nature of the appellant’s excuse appears to be that the appellant was fearful of sergeant when he approached the vehicle, and she drove away out of a flight response.
Justified, in response to protect property from a business entity who is known to steal cars and extort money. Furthermore, Acts passed after 1973, assented by the Queen of Australia, a statutory office absence of a head of power, pursuant to the Royal Style and Titles Act of 1973, P.28.
Interpretation Act, West Australia, defines the Crown as Her Majesty, His Majesty, Queen or King, Sovereign of the United Kingdom. Clause 2, an Act to extend the Queen’s successors:
The provisions of this Act referring to the Queen shall extend to Her Majesty’s heirs and successors in sovereignty of the United Kingdom.
And clause 5 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution, operation of the constitution and laws:
This act and all laws made by parliament of the Commonwealth, under the Constitution, shall be binding on the courts and judges, and the people of every State, and every part of the Commonwealth.
Now, section 11 of the State Solicitor’s response, assault, deprivation and liberty and contempt. The appellant – so he’s saying that these grounds allege that the appellant was assaulted, deprived of her liberty and threatened with contempt at the conclusion of sentencing. Now, the appellant, deprived of her liberty, as a reserve decision, the male court security officer blocked the door to prevent me going – from leaving the room, upon conclusion of the reserve decision, to receive paperwork. A basic right to go to the bathroom was denied. Severely traumatised from this whole event, page 13 of the transcript of the reserve decision, 23.04.2024, her Honour:
Be quiet.
The accused:
I’m scared. My heart rate is going.
This is the court officer:
Okay. Fair enough. She has already been assaulted once in here.
Accused:
I have been assaulted by court staff before.
Her Honour:
Well, then just walk there. It’s very simple. Okay. As soon as you go and get your paperwork, you can go. P.29.
Accused:
I need a comfort break.
You can’t leave.
Accused:
You can visit the bathroom or the toilet any time you want to.
No, you can’t leave.
Accused:
I need to go to the toilet. I have to go to the toilet. Please let me go to the toilet.
I’ve had children, I have a weak bladder. Enough said. Okay, JSO, “You have to”. This is not the first time that Magistrate Woods has ordered the court security to assault me. I was physically forced into a box, and I find it incredibly traumatising to go into that court. Like, I kid you not, I’m just – that’s why I’m shaking today. Section 60 of the State Solicitor’s response:
The respondent submits there is no basis, on the evidence, that the transcript suggests any assault or deprivation of liberty.
I would like to see him being stopped from going to the toilet as not a deprivation of liberty and basic right:
Furthermore, the magistrate’s warning regarding contempt was an appropriate response to the appellant refusing to comply with magistrate’s directions in the courtroom.
No contempt of court in a corporate Magistrates Court, upon conclusion of the matter in a reserve decision, assaulted upon the direction of Magistrate Woods, by a female, and male court security officer, forced into a box. When asked what is the box, I was told it was punishment. We are currently receiving counselling by the court, which actually – we’ve actually withdrawn from the court intervention program because it was a conflict of interest because we – however, we will be seeking counselling from the trauma we’ve received there.
We’ve had meetings with the court intervention P.30.
program, so we are currently receiving counselling. This matter has severely impacted my mental health and has severely harmed me. Section 61 of the submissions, Magistrate Woods, by direction, insulted the appellant on a separate occasion where we were directly – I’m sorry, the cat again. I’m sorry. I’m so sorry. I thought my phone was off. Okay. Sorry.
Magistrate Woods, by direction – sorry, I’m laughing, it’s not appropriate to laugh, because I’m – sorry. Okay. Sorry. We do not agree to -I’ve nearly finished, it’s all good. We do not agree to costs in this matter. Trent Banner was in default, and could not prove that he was in compliance with the statutes that he was enforcing. Forrest & Forrest Pty Ltd v Wilson HCA 30.
When a system of government is changed from a constitutional foundation to one without a constitution, it is utterly bankrupt of authority, want of authority. The revolution of 1973 witnesses a change from the authority of the Commonwealth, the people of Australia, and the authority of the Australian government that has no reference in the constitution of the Commonwealth and is, to this day, without the approval of the voters.
Such government authority is not only a pretended, but illegal for the act of contempt to the Constitution and the sovereign of the parliament of the Commonwealth. I stand before here as a British national, with the protection of the Crown, under section 16 and 23 of the Supreme Court Act of 1935, entrenches the authority of the Crown.
Just in closing, all references to Federal statutes post-1973 are taken not to be relied upon by the appellant for the demonstration of federal policy of the pretended Australian parliament. All references to State statutes and regulations, post-1986, are taken not to be relied upon, but for policy of corporate government or parliament, that being a pretended – not of the office of Governor, under the letters patent, with no inference of the pretended laws were cast upon your Honour.
With reference, the totality of my statements, I believe that the prosecutor and State Solicitors have no authority to appear in a Crown Court for failure of disclosure of a pretended authority and power in commission of a crime of section 44 of the Criminal Code 1914. Without demonstration to the contrary, the opposing counsel may not be heard. Nature of standing, as a national of England, it is my understanding that the law of the United P.31
Kingdom, and its protection, follows such nationals, especially where the Crown is entrenched, and most especially where valid law is unavailable, such as where pretended law usurps the law founded by the respective constitution of the Commonwealth and State.
I call for the disclosure of any competent – competing interest at ploy here today. Are you not so composed, and sitting under the notice in this courtroom, that of the royal coat of arms. Thank you.
WHITBY J: Thank you, Dawn. Yes. Mr Mayne. P.32.
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